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ABSTRACT 
 
The research aim of this Master’s thesis is to explore to what extent the roles that politicians 
play in parliamentary structures are shaped and influenced by their career ambitions. More 
precisely, the thesis proposes to investigate this relation in a « unique institutional 
laboratory »: the European Parliament (EP). The main assumption of the thesis is that it is 
possible to establish a clear relationship between the way Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) relate to their career plans and the way they interpret their parliamentary 
roles. In order to answer the research question, the thesis proceeds with a qualitative and 
explorative case study of “specific” politicians in a “specific” context: French members of the 
European People’s Party (EPP) in the 2014-2019 legislature of the EP. Based on eight 
respondents semi-structured interviews and on background information on the political 
profiles of the different interviewees, the thesis demonstrates that the French delegation 
mobilizes three different representative styles shaped by different ambitions: the European 
Animator, the French Politician and the Local Specialist. These ideal-types are the results of 
an abductive and motivational approach to the empirical material, which allows in turn the 
thesis to enter directly in discussion with mainstream previous research, namely the American 
political science “ambition theory”. Whereas the thesis agrees with American political 
scientists that there clearly is a relationship between the interpretations MEPs make of their 
role(s) and their (un)revealed career goals, it however advocates for more nuanced and 
contextualized tools of analyses of ambitions. The thesis ends with concluding remarks on the 
implications of the empirical findings for previous and future research. 
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"Max Weber (1965) advanced a similar duality of the pursuit of public station, that one 
"lives off politics, or one lives for politics". Under this definition, either politics as a 
career is pursued as an ends to sustain one's self, like any other profession; or, 
alternatively, there is a political animal, a person who engages in civic life because he 
or she cannot imagine doing anything else and who serves for a variety of motives that 
defy fiscal security. Politicians who live for politics are like sharks in the sea: if they do 
not swim, they do not breathe." 
 
Ronald K. Gaddie (2004) "Born to Run: Origins of the Political Career" (p.9) 
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I) INTRODUCTION 
 
a) « Ambition lies at the heart of politics  » 
 
A bit less than fifty years ago, the American scholar Joseph Schlesinger released a book that 
would completely change our way of understanding and conceiving the mandates of 
parliamentarians. « Ambition lies at the heart of politics » (1966: 1) was the opening line and 
main argument of the political scientist. 
 
Indeed, as Borchert (2011) perfectly summarizes: « Politicians tend to be an ambitious crowd. 
Few content themselves with a short stint in political office and then happily return to their 
prior occupation. (…). Professional politicians- who in that regard do not differ markedly 
from practitioners in any other distinguished profession- want to stay on and they want to rise. 
(…) Politicians themselves not only know which offices do exist, but also what one’s 
individual chances of obtaining a particular office are and what comparative value that office 
has in relation to others » (p. 118-119).  
 
These conceptions of the political office are well-established across the Atlantic and they 
have guided an impressive amount of quantitative and qualitative research on the impact that 
career ambitions exercise on the legislative activity of American politicians, whether they are 
local councilmen, Congressmen or the Presidents themselves. Most of these studies have 
focused on how parliamentarians’ ambitions influence the content of their votes: their 
argument is that a specific type of ambition generates a particular set of behaviours which in 
fine can be determined empirically. 
 
It should therefore come a bit as a surprise that these fruitful tools of analysis have been 
marginalized in most contemporary research in European studies. While American scholars 
have for a long time impregnated the research field of EU integration with powerful and 
influential theoretical concepts, these have surprisingly been overpassed in Europe when it 
comes to analyse those, who in many regards, play the most important role in the decision-
making process : our politicians and more precisely, our members of Parliament (MPs).  
 
As if European politicians were less ambitious than their American counterparts. 
 
As if ambition was not a shared value among the elected representatives of the Old Continent. 
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Moreover, this general reluctance is particularly true to a « unique institutional laboratory »: 
the European Parliament (EP) and its members (MEPs). 
 
The EP has indisputably been given uneven attention by the researchers interested in 
European integration and more generally European issues. Whereas other institutions such as 
the European Commission and the European Council have been the centre of focus of most 
scholars from the beginning of the European project, the EP on the other hand, which initially 
suffered from an important lack of power, and its members, who originally were national 
delegates, have only recently started steering attention on their behalf.  
 
Moreover, the motivations which lie behind the tenure of a « European political office » have 
been under-scrutinized. The career plans and career paths of European parliamentarians have 
been more or less neglected by an important amount of the literature and when they have 
actually been taken into consideration, it has been done only-so-imperfectly. Indeed, a large 
proportion of the literature is dedicated to quantitative analyses of legislative behaviours, 
perhaps best represented by the neo-institutionalist school of thought of Simon Hix et al. An 
overwhelming majority of these works have stressed the importance of the selection rules of 
candidates and the party-system to explain how in turn ambition can shape behaviours within 
the chamber (Hix et al. 2012). Surprisingly though, much less attention has been given to 
other dimensions of the « representative style »: namely, roles. 
 
After all, parliamentarians can hardly be reduced to their voting prerogative. Even though the 
EP has seen its powers increase drastically in the past years and the generalisation of the 
« ordinary legislative procedure » has conferred more weight to the institution, MEPs cannot 
be limited to the votes they produce during once-a-month plenary sessions in Strasbourg. 
MEPs interact, play and evolve very differently from one another in the EP. For instance, 
while some parliamentarians choose to specialize in committee-work, others prefer to 
prioritize other type of legislative activities. While certain are allocated important reports, 
others dedicate their time to speaking during group meetings. Some MEPs are extremely 
satisfied by their European mandate while others wait (im)patiently for new opportunities to 
come before leaving the European Parliament. Why is that the case? How can we explain 
these divergences when it comes to MEPs’ role-playing? What part does ambition play in all 
of that ? 
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b) Relevance of the study 
 
These questions are relevant both from an academic perspective and for policy-practitioners. 
As Susan Scarrow (1997) explained, studying the career movements of MEPs is important 
because it tells us something about European institutions and their future. She makes a 
distinction between three types of career in the EP and notes the following about the 
increasing amount of parliamentarians who choose to fully invest in their European mandate: 
« Such records make it much more likely that future assemblies will be populated with 
careerist MEPs who view the European Parliament as their main political arena, and who seek 
to increase the prestige of their institution and its power relative to other European and 
domestics institutions » (p. 261). Therefore studying career paths, and more precisely the 
ambitions of MEPs, reveal something about the institution in itself and about how it is 
perceived in other member states (MS) through the lenses of different cultural sensibilities. As 
Kauppi (1996) notes about European Union institutions and French political careers: 
« Evidence seems to indicate that the simple reason why French politicians are unlikely to 
support rectifying the European democratic deficit by creating a supranational and federal 
state has more to do with the structure of the domestic political markets and the political 
trajectories of individuals in them, than with the structure of European institutions 
themselves » (p. 18). Studying the political will and the wished-futures of politicians are, 
from these perspectives, good indicators of the « desirability » of the EP as an institution and 
more generally of the EU’s popularity. These factors can also help to reanimate the classical 
debate between rationalism and constructivism, between plans and pleasure, and to a certain 
extent, between cynicism and instinct: to what extent does ambition explain the roles MEPs 
adopt? Without any doubt, answers to this interrogation will interest a large range of policy-
stakeholders: home-parties, groups in the EP and the MEPs themselves. 
 
This Master’s thesis proposes to answer all of these questions through an explorative study of 
the French delegation to the European People Party in the 2014-2019 legislature. To do so, 
eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the delegation in order to 
understand to what extent ambition shape the roles MEPs adopt in the hemi-cycle. The French 
delegation is used as an exemplifying case and, to a certain extent, a critical case. Indeed, 
whereas in American political science and in American politics talking of one’s ambitions is 
pretty common, a French politician with the national calibre of an MEP would never talk in 
the same way as Senator John McCain (2002: 373) did in his memoires: « I didn’t decide to 
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run for president to start a national crusade for the political reforms I believed in or to run a 
campaign as if it were some grand act of patriotism. In truth, I wanted to be president 
because it had become my ambition to be president. In truth, I’d had the ambition for a long 
time » (quoted in Öhberg 2011: 172). If we found that ambitions influence the roles of French 
politicians in the European Parliament in a way that differs from one another, then there are 
good reasons to think that this scheme could apply at the scale of the whole group, or even to 
every MEPs of the legislature.  
 
In addition, a study which focuses exclusively on the ambitions of French politicians is 
relevant for the general topic of ambition and roles: France has historically played an 
important part in the European integration process and French MEPs, with diverse intensities, 
have been key-players of this assembly. Moreover, in this legislature the EPP Group is the 
biggest political group in the EP, which means that it ensures the most important leadership 
positions in the assembly. In these regards, the 2014 French delegation is no exception to the 
rule: with 20 parliamentarians, it is the third biggest delegation in the EPP Group. It is 
composed of many incumbent MEPs who exercise responsibilities in every possible 
department of the EP (member of the bureau of the EP, member of the bureau of the EPP 
Group, Chair and Vice-Chairs of Committees, Coordinators and Vice-Coordinators for the 
EPP in Committees, Presidency and Vice-Presidencies of delegations). Other « freshmen » 
MEPs have exercised important responsibilities at the national level: former senior ministers, 
ministers, secretary of state and members of parliament (the National Assembly especially) 
compose this group of people. In other words, « ambition » is not just an empty word for 
these politicians and the objectives they may have are actually reachable. Their ambitions 
make sense. 
 
c) Research aim and question(s)  
 
The research aim of this Master thesis is to explore to what extent the roles that politicians 
play in parliamentary structures are shaped and influenced by their career ambitions. More 
precisely, the thesis proposes to investigate this relation in a « unique institutional 
laboratory »: the European Parliament (EP). Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
typically face several career paths: they can choose to invest fully in a « European career », 
they can use their mandate as a stepping-stone for national politics or they can decide to end 
their career in the EP (Scarrow 1997). These career choices are grandly conditioned by their 
personal ambitions. At the same time, MEPs can decide to interpret and invest in very 
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different manners their parliamentary mandates. Because of the relative lack of 
institutionalisation of the EP (Beauvallet 2003), MEPs face multiple choices in how to 
prioritize their behaviours in the assembly and what role(s) they can or wish to « play » within 
its walls. The « bet » of this thesis is that we can establish a clear relationship between the 
interpretations MEPs make of their role(s) and their (un)revealed career goals. The principal 
aim of the thesis is to ask how MEPs relate to their career ambitions and if/how their future 
plans and parliamentary roles in any way are correlated, or at least clearly linked. 
Consequently, the research question of this thesis is: 
 
How do career ambitions shape the roles MEPs adopt in the assembly? 
 
d) Outline of the thesis 
 
The Master’s thesis is structured into several chapters in order to answer the overarching 
research question. In chapter II, we present what has been done before us in the area of 
political ambition and roles. More precisely, the chapter is divided in several themes relevant 
to the research question: we first show what has been done in the American political science 
literature in the domain of ambition before turning to the « state-of-play » of the question in 
the European studies’ field. We then describe how these issues were addressed in the French 
constructivist and legislative careers’ literature and how they are relevant to our topic of 
discussion. We conclude this section by establishing what will be the core of this thesis: a 
motivational approach to role and career ambitions. This approach is further developed in the 
chapter III of the thesis where the best method for gathering qualitative data is argued for. The 
thesis is an explorative qualitative case study of the 2014 French delegation to the European 
People’s Party based on eight respondents' semi-structured interviews with members of the 
European Parliament. Further data is gathered based on the political profiles of the MEPs in 
order to add more complete and useful information for our enquiries. The chapter then 
demonstrates why an approach by ideal-types is best for the analysis and presents the coding 
strategy, which is based on the literature and previous theoretical foundations. The chapter IV 
of this Master’s thesis is also the core of the paper: the data is analysed in that section. Based 
on the empirical evidence, three ideal-types of French MEPs’ roles and ambitions are 
established: European Animators, French Politicians and Local Specialists. These semantic 
and empirical constructions are the fruit of an abductive approach based on the interviews and 
combined with the MEPs’ political profiles. Each ideal-type is composed of a unique set of 
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roles and ambitions which allows us to distinguish MEPs of the sample based on those 
factors. In Chapter V, we discuss how these findings actually help us to answer the research 
question. The results of this explorative thesis seem to suggest that if ambitions do shape the 
roles MEPs adopt in the chamber, it does so only imperfectly and not how the literature 
usually describes it. We plea for the use of new political science « tools » in order to give 
better context and more nuance to the ambitions of politicians. We end the thesis with some 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. Previous research and theory 
 
a) Career ambitions in American political science  
 
The strategies or ambitions that MEPs adopt have surprisingly been under-developed in 
European studies to explain other types of behaviours in the EP. While there exists a wide, 
comparative and quantitative literature on voting patterns of MEPs, still not much is known 
about their roles in the assembly (to the notable exception of Scully et al. 2003 ; Bale et al. 
2006 ; Navarro 2009 ; Costa et al. 2009 but on very different topics). How MEPs interpret 
their roles of representatives, how they understand their mandate and what priorities they give 
to their functions lacks systematic research. Moreover, these analyses have, to my knowledge, 
never been studied under the banner of ambitions. 
 
Role and ambition « theories » are however well known from American (and British) political 
scientists and scholars such as Donald Searing (1991) and Joseph Schlesinger (1966) are 
recognised authorities in the field. Whereas their theoretical concepts have been used 
separately to analyse behaviour in the EP (Hix et al. 2013 ; Meserve et al. 2009 ; Navarro 
2009), nobody has yet explicitly used ambition as an explanatory factor of MEPs’ roles. That 
is the goal of this thesis.  
 
In his 2004 scholarly book on different congressional candidates and their electoral 
campaigns around the US, Gaddie notes the following about a theory of ambition: « Political 
ambition theory presumes that all politicians have motivations for office. The question that 
ambition theory has been a vehicle for answering is « Why do people run? ». Then, once 
people win office, students of ambition theory turn to another question: « How do people use 
their office to fulfil their ambitions? » » (p. 19). Indeed, Schlesinger argues (cited in Black 
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1972) that « the central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician’s behaviour is a 
response to his office goals. Or to put it another way, the politician as office-seeker engages in 
political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office… It makes little difference to 
the theory of ambition whether men adopt the ambitions suitable to the office or attain the 
office because of their ambitions » (p. 144). As we see, one assumption of this model is that 
politicians behave in a rational manner when selecting among alternative offices and that 
« rather than being driven by excessive ambition, they tend to develop ambition slowly as a 
result of their changing circumstances » (Black 1972: 145). This means that politicians are 
aware of the environment in which they evolve and their actual capacity of moving from one 
office to another. Moreover, politicians act accordingly to these office-goals in their everyday 
work. We should therefore be able to « spot » empirically ambitious behaviours and their 
consequences on the roles of MEPs.  
 
Schlesinger conceptualizes ambition as either discrete, a one-term office followed by the 
withdrawal from public office (or in Gaddie’s words (2004 : 19) : « discrete ambition 
embodies in the minds of some the « classic » notions of American politics : duty for the sake 
of duty, a limited tenure of office, and then a return to private life »);  static, the wish from a 
politician to make a long career out of one office/position ; or as progressive, that is the 
aspiration to seek a higher office from the one that the politician actually holds (1966 : 10). 
Herrick et al. (1993) add to this typology intrainstitutional ambition, that is the desire of a 
leadership position within an institution. Empirically, these categories are constructed after 
observing behavioural differences in the legislative activities of Congressmen and MPs. Every 
form of ambition is unique in the sense that it results in behaviours distinct from those 
generated by other types of ambitions. For example, Herrick et al. theorize that members with 
progressive ambition are expected to be more active than their colleagues: they should 
introduce larger amount of legislation and be more active on the floor (measured as the 
number of speeches and amendments). Moreover, they expect that progressive ambitious 
politicians will be less specialized than their colleagues because they pursue broad policy 
agendas (1993: 767-8). On the other hand, « members with intrainstitutional ambition are 
expected to honour the norm of legislative specialization since those who engage in hard, 
detailed work in a narrow area have traditionally been rewarded with respect from fellow 
members » (p.768).  
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These analyses are fruitful because they give a clear guide in how to distinguish politicians by 
their ambitions but they are not unproblematic. Specifically, how do we « operationalize » 
these concepts and data to the context of the European Parliament? Even though ambitious 
politicians are not a particular feature of American politics, the aforementioned tools of 
analysis are too much anchored within the American context to be used as such in a study on 
the EP. For example, MEPs cannot introduce any type of legislation: it is exclusively the 
prerogative of the European Commission. Moreover, it is also hard for European 
parliamentarians to pursue broad policy agendas because of the limited amount of power of 
the EP and because of the internal functioning of the chamber: MEPs are divided within 
committees which lead to the specialization of behaviours and an increased control from party 
groups of their members’ behaviours (Bowler & Farrell 1995). This has led many to talk of a 
unique parliamentary style for MEPs: the figure of the eurodéputé expert (Beauvallet & 
Michon 2012).  
 
Other issues have been raised by scholars concerning these studies of ambitions: actually, they 
do not really measure ambition. To their own acknowledgment, Herrick et al. agree that 
quantitative analysis of ambition have to be seen as « surrogate measures » (1993: 766). 
Indeed, « systematic examination of ambition is problematic because ambition is best thought 
of as a psychological predisposition » (Hibbing cited in Herrick et al. 1993: 766). In a note 
written years later, Herrick (2001) refines her previous results by conducting a study based on 
surveys of congressional candidates in order to analyse to what extent ambition affect 
legislators’ behaviours. Her argument is that most scholarly works have been done reversely, 
leading to fuzzy results and « instead of testing whether ambition affects behaviour, (it) tests 
whether members with certain legislative styles are more apt to seek higher positions » (p. 
470). In this vein, ambitions are more the construct of social scientists than the actual wishes 
of politicians. This is exactly what Gaddie (2004) claims when he remarks that « studies of 
political careers and political ambition are usually exercises in backward mapping. One looks 
at the successful candidates for the highest offices and sees who fails or succeeds in moving 
up (…). In other words, most of the ambition scholarship is about politicians who have 
established careers and who are in the midst of pursuing crystallized, progressive ambitions. » 
(p. 16-7). That is problematic because this is how most research on ambition has been 
conducted the past decades: these results therefore have to be relativized, as Herrick finds that 
even though ambition does affect behaviour, it does so only weakly (2001: 471). Hence, there 
is a real need in social research to move out from « career paths » studies which have been 
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used until now interchangeably to designate « ambition studies ». There are important 
differences between both approaches that imply methodological and empirical consequences. 
We now turn to what has been done in European studies concerning politicians’ behaviours 
and ambitions. 
 
b) Quantitative studies of voting behaviours in the European Parliament: the 
neo-institutionalist literature 
 
As Hix et al. (2003) note « the development of academic writing and research on the EP has 
broadly been a function of the powers and prestige of the chamber » (p. 193) and, since the 
new powers granted to the EP in the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, research 
interests on the topic have not stopped increasing. In this sense, since the 1990’s, academic 
literature on the political behaviours of MEPs is well established in the field of European 
studies.  
 
Among the research field, several scholars have shown the concrete influence that career 
paths play on the voting behaviours of MEPs (Hix et al. 2012, 2013; Meserve et al. 2009). 
Indeed, in a vast part of the literature, career paths and parliamentarians' wished future 
orientations have been used to explain different types of behaviours within the chamber. For 
example, these scholars demonstrate that MEPs wishing to gain influence within the 
European institution will have a greater tendency to vote along the lines of their party group 
in the EP than along those of their national parties at home, when these interests clash. 
Moreover, the type of political career envisioned by a politician determines how valuable 
different type of activities are to this politician: in this sense, « since political ambitions 
influence legislators’ priorities, those who plan to exit the EP to return to national politics or 
to retire from politics altogether are far less likely to participate actively in the legislative 
activities of the parliament. » (Hix et al. 2012: 17).  
 
In these respects, the very important work of Hix et al. has contributed to increase our 
understanding of how strategies and career paths influence MEPs’ voting behaviour in the EP. 
The institutionalist-rationalist approach has constructed extremely sophisticated models to 
help us predict and create patterns of voting behaviour linked to MEPs’ career plans. These 
models assume that the primary goal of the vast majority of MEPs is to be re-elected (Hix et 
al. 1999: 12). In order to fulfil this objective, MEPs face very different strategies (which often 
are mutually exclusive) that will considerably influence their behaviours in the EP. They can 
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either aim at re-selection (by pursuing actions that promote the interests of their domestic 
party who controls the re-selection process), policy (by engaging in actions that will promote 
the interests of their domestic constituents who in fine assures their election) or office (by 
increasing their personal profile in the EP and securing positions of authority and prestige in 
the chamber to make them essential candidates). 
 
MEPs evolve in a constraining environment, not least because they are agents who must 
respond to two principals when they vote: the national parties, who control the selection of 
candidates in the EP elections, and the political groups in the EP who control a variety of 
private goods in the chamber such as leaderships positions, committee assignments, speaking 
time and the legislative agenda (Hix 2002: 688). Therefore, one of the main tasks of an MEP 
is to select an appropriate balance of priorities when voting in the assembly. Moreover, 
variations in these pressures will produce variations in MEPs behaviour : for instance, their 
personal profile, the national party and political group to which they belong, or the fact that 
their party is sitting in the government at home will affect what they seek to do in the 
parliament and what they realistically can do (Hix et al. 1999 : 8). Whereas Scarrow (1997 : 
261) argued that MEPs would eventually grow independent from national parties, Hix et al. 
conclusions are that MEPs are essentially « national parliamentarians » and that their personal 
ideological preferences and the Member State from which they come from are stronger 
predictors of their attitudes towards EU policies than their EP group political affiliation (Hix 
et al. 2002 : 678). Simply said, MEPs respond more to their national party principal than the 
"Eurogroup" with which they sit in the EP. 
 
Several scholars have shown the theoretical and empirical limits of such models to predict or 
at least explain different range of attitudes within the EP (Carrubba & Gabel 1999; 
Rasmussen 2008). First, and turning towards our research question, models based solely on 
voting patterns are unsatisfactory to give full accounts of behaviours in parliamentary 
structures. One can hardly limit parliamentarians to their voting behaviours not least because 
their functions are by essence much wider: they are elected representatives. Second, voting 
behaviours are biased to a certain point because they are based on « flawed » data : by lack of 
other means, scholars such as Hix et al. (2002, 2003, 2012, 2013) and Faas (2003) use roll-
call votes analysis to test their variables. However, roll-call votes represent barely one-third of 
all the votes in the EP (the other options being the show of hands and electronic votes) and 
they are politically « charged »: they are used unevenly by the political groups and not on all 
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issues. Corbett et al. (2000) argue that they are used in three ways: to show the party’s 
position to the public on an issue, to embarrass another party or to keep a check of their own 
members’ behaviour (p. 150). Third, quantitative studies of voting behaviours are insufficient 
to explain thoroughly patterns and decisions of MEPs (Rasmussen 2008). Indeed, most 
quantitative studies assume that MEPs face a limited amount of choice when they vote: they 
either vote for or against a text and these choices are indicators of their "preference" toward 
one principal (may it be the home party, their EP group or the constituents). Why in some 
cases MEPs choose to register an abstention or not to participate to the vote is badly explained 
by the previously-mentioned models. In fact, in-depth interviews with 14 Danish MEPs reveal 
that the choices they face are much more complex than that: most of the time, MEPs choose 
not to choose when a policy conflict emerges between their group and their party (2008: 15). 
The lessons to draw from this preliminary previous research section are three-folded for our 
research question: first, MEPs cannot be limited to their voting behaviours to explain other 
range of behaviours. Second, it would greatly benefit to our analysis to draw out from 
stereotypical clichés about parliamentarians: they do not all aim for re-election and they do 
not make trade-offs all the times between different principals. Third, quantitative studies on 
MEPs are limited and there is a real need to accentuate research within the qualitative field to 
give a full and accurate account of behaviours and attitudes within the EP. To do so: first, by 
drawing theoretical concepts and new « variables » from American political science to 
explain the roles of MEPs, namely ambition, as it was done in the former section ; second, by 
exploring what other types of literature have done on the topic, namely French constructivist 
scholars and the legislative career literature, before turning to the core of this thesis: a 
motivational approach. 
 
c) Ambition in the structural constructivist and legislative careers literature  
 
We need, therefore, to nuance our understanding of ambition. In this sense, the structural 
constructivist literature is rich in theoretical concepts (Kauppi 1996; Beauvallet 2003, 2009). 
Structural constructivists per se hardly ever mention ambition as such in European studies. 
This is probably less surprising than in the neo-institutionalist literature because the 
theoretical foundations of constructivism do not give much space to actors and individual 
trajectories in general. Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s work on social fields and capitals, 
scholars like Beauvallet define the European Parliament as a « structuring structure » (2010: 
171). Studies of « Eurocracy » consider that European institutions have to be seen as an 
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autonomous field that is increasingly professionalizing and institutionalizing itself and as the 
« permanent social space where there are people (some permanent, others part-time) 
competing to define European policies, norms and instruments as well as the skills of 
legitimate definition. » (Georgakakis 2010: 331). Simply said, the EP cannot be studied like 
any other political object (such as the US Congress) and with over-simplified constraining 
variables (such as nationality or party groups), but should rather be understood as a closed 
space that is governed by its own logic. This has numerous implications for the research 
question of this thesis. 
 
First, ambitious politicians are constrained by the logic of their institutions. For example, 
Beauvallet’s (2005) longitudinal analysis of the profiles of the different President of the 
European Parliament between 1979 and 1999 demonstrates that the « emergence of a capital 
specific to the institution which holding would stand out to be imperative to occupy 
leadership positions in the EP » is essential to understand the institution (p. 109). Therefore 
when it comes to intrainstitutional ambition as it was defined beforehand, only MEPs 
endowed with a specific type of resource, « une expérience politique proprement 
européenne », will succeed in their ambitions. This means concretely that being a former 
important minister from a big member state does not constitute (partly) anymore a resource in 
itself to pretend to leadership positions within the institution. Other resources are valued in 
the European « field »: the production of an expertise, the posture of the specialist who is 
hard-working and diligent (p. 117-8). The detention of a symbolical capital acquired in the 
national political field is not enough anymore to occupy positions of leadership and prestige 
in the EP (p.118). 
 
Second, there are methodological implications for our research question and for a theory of 
ambition. One of the structural constructivists' core arguments is that you can measure 
institutionalization processes by evaluating the socio-political background of members of 
parliaments. Several studies have shown that the profiles of MEPs are fundamentally different 
from the one of French members of parliament for example: MEPs are younger, more 
feminine, and particularly less endowed with political capital than their national counterparts 
(Kauppi 1996). The implications are two-folded: first, gathering quantitative data on MEPs 
(level of income, diplomas, previous career, gender, age for example) can become good 
indicators of their ambitions. Once again, acting a posteriori, the background of leadership 
positions in the EP illustrates common characteristics between parliamentarians : presidents 
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and vice-president of committees have the tendency to share the same longevity of mandate, 
at least 10 years in 75% of the cases (Marrel & Payre 2006 : 88). Second, success in ambition 
is (implicitly) conditioned to the possession of certain specific « qualities ».  
 
Whereas these analyses are very powerful to explain the evolution of the chamber and the 
distribution of power within it (namely contextualizing intrainstitutional ambition), they 
become, in my opinion, insufficient to explain other types of behaviours from MEPs and other 
types of ambitions. In these regards, what constitutes progressive ambition anymore for 
European parliamentarians? This question can hardly be answered by establishing tables of 
hard-coded quantitative data but has to be pursued in another way. To a certain extent, that is 
what legislative careers studies have been attempting to do the past decade. 
 
One central assumption of most career paths and ambition studies is that, when it comes to the 
European Parliament, an important amount of politicians uses it as a stepping-stone for a 
national political career. This is how Scarrow (1997) describes MEPs trajectories. She argues 
that MEPs can order their careers in the EP in three different way: those who use their seats 
for winning or regaining national political office; those who show a long and primary 
commitment to their European jobs, thus investing in a « European career »; and a third group 
for whom a seat in the EP is synonym of « Political Deadend », and who stay in the 
Parliament only briefly and who are not subsequently elected to national or European office 
(1997: 259). In her paper, Scarrow compares the French, German, Italian and British 
delegations of MEPs between 1979 and 1994 and concludes that a significant proportion of 
representatives from these countries pursue European careers. As we can see, she takes as a 
standpoint that these paths only make sense if we compare them from the national perspective 
of politicians. However, that is far from being evident. As Kjaer (2001) notes, it is « rather 
peculiar that the description of the MEPs is based on their political past (former experiences 
at other levels) and their political future (which levels are target of their political ambition?) 
instead of their political present (the European office) » (p.3). That is to say that most career 
studies are a priori biased because they consider that politicians most desired future resides 
nationally, or as Westlake (cited in Kjaer 2001 : 2) puts it, that « the only way up is out ». 
 
Moreover, the stepping-stone argument has been challenged in numerous works. Whereas the 
conventional wisdom holds that the national level is the apex of professional political careers, 
the emergence of new supranational institutions like the EP and relatively low exchange rates 
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between institutions (from the EP to the French national assembly for example and vice versa) 
suggests that parliaments at the European level also function as career arenas in their own 
rights (Stolz 2001). « The mere inclusion of national political career in the description of the 
MEPs leads the reader to treat this dimension as an influential characteristic » (Kjaer 2001: 6) 
but the line remains pretty open and has to be interrogated in new ways. Politicians’ ambitions 
are complex and not one-folded. They can hardly be limited to « uni-directional » career paths 
(Stolz 2001: 18).  
 
In this sense, the theory of political capital is precious because it gives a context to ambition: 
in short, ambition does not have the same meaning from one MEP to another. If we 
understand political capital as « the main social resource that constitutes the object and means 
of struggle in the political field: political knowledge, recognition, competence and prestige » 
(Kauppi 1996: 4), then we can have a first hint of the different categories of MEPs based on 
their priorities. Kauppi considers three types of careers for French MEPs: those that combine 
in their careers both national and regional politics; those who are national politicians; and 
those who are regional politicians (1996: 8). This is another way to understand MEPs’ 
ambitions even though the line has progressively become blurred to define promotion. For 
example, is a seat in the French parliament more prestigious than one in the EP? These 
considerations have largely been studied under the scope of the socio-political background of 
parliamentarians: where they come from, where they studied, what kind of resources are they 
endowed with, determines what they wish and can realistically do with their careers. For 
example, Kauppi suggests that in terms of career patterns the position of an MEP in French 
political hierarchies can be compared to those of national deputy and top-level regional 
representative (medium high-level) (1996 : 16). This means that staying in the EP is also a 
position of prestige and worthy in itself. 
 
Turning back to the research question, this section elaborates the different ways one can 
understand ambition in the scholarly literature. Even though it is largely underdeveloped in 
European studies, an ambition theory is possible to establish. In the next section, I propose to 
develop a definition of MEPs roles and to conduct an explorative study that uses ambition as 
the principal influence and distinguishing factor for MEPs roles. 
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d) Ambition and roles: towards a motivational approach 
 
A role theory of parliamentary behaviours in the European Parliament is also pretty much 
absent from the scholarly debates. To the notable exceptions of certain academics (Navarro 
2009; Bale & Taggart 2006; Scully & Farrell 2003), not much has been done in the field to 
categorize and make typologies of MEPs based on their roles, attitudes and behaviours. Once 
again, the main source of inspiration comes from Anglo-Saxon political science where role 
« theory » is a well-established tradition in legislative studies. 
 
There are three main approaches in the field to the analysis of parliamentarian roles (Searing 
1991). The structural approach first developed in the 1950-60’s, emphasises the dominance 
of institution over individuals. From this perspective, roles are constructed and maintained by 
institutions: they have little to do with individual preferences and they will continue to exist in 
the institution whether or not these individuals choose to play them. The interactional 
approach is the second dominant paradigm to cover role theory. Here, roles are seen as a set 
of informal rules created and recreated through interaction, especially through negotiations 
between individual and their associates. The chief contribution to this approach is that 
« individuals participate in defining their own role, that these roles have variations, and that 
they are usually undergoing change » (Searing 1991: 1246). 
 
Whereas these two first approaches neglected either « both institutional specifics and 
exogenous preferences » and « overemphasised the extent to which roles were about 
expectations of others and the degree of conformity to them » (Bale & Taggart 2006: 7), the 
motivational approach of Searing has proven to be one of the most efficient to categorize 
MEPs based on their roles, and will be the one used in this thesis. The approach is based on 
three assumptions: the preferences and incentives that politicians use in adapting to their 
institution are acquired before they take their post; rationality is a dominant feature of the 
institution in which politicians construct their roles: the perspectives and agendas of 
politicians are independent of interactions (Searing 1991: 1248). It is therefore a rational 
approach to neo-institutionalism which « aims principally at describing situational-specific 
role orientations, as well as emphasizing the influence of individual preferences, incentives 
and rationalities determined not just within but also outside the institutional context » (Bale et 
al. 2006 : 7). Schematically speaking, Searing’s argument is that we can understand how MPs 
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adopt particular roles in relation to their emotional incentives, or as Rozenberg (2009) puts it, 
because of the pleasure they take in occupying certain positions.  
 
The main contribution of this approach is that it encourages the reconstruction of political 
roles as they are understood by their players. It also integrates different tradition of political 
science by recognising that the roles of politicians are embedded in institutional context while 
at the same time treating the role players as purposive actors with independent standpoints 
(Searing 1991: 1252). Searing also makes a distinction between position and preference roles: 
the first is associated with positions that require the performance of many specific duties and 
responsibilities and is thus easily recognisable (whips, group and committee presidents for 
example). The second is perhaps the most interesting for our study because preference roles 
are associated with positions that require the performance of few specific duties 
(Searing 1991: 1249). Roles are therefore comparatively unconstrained by the institution and 
are more easily shaped by the preferences of the role player. Here it is crucial to understand 
why certain politicians adopt roles that they are not constrained to have while others, due to 
their position in the assembly, are obliged to do very many duties.  
 
It is thus a profoundly interpretative approach that gives space to politicians to define 
themselves and their roles. As a consequence, all motivational role « theory » is inductive and 
hence rarely tests previous role theory. Indeed, roles are dynamic and embedded with actors 
so it is impossible to expect precise resurgence of behaviour across legislatures and across 
parliaments. A greater importance is also given to the psychological level rather than the 
« burden » of institutions: the analysis focuses on the emotional incentives of actors and tries 
to understand why roles structure the selection, interpretation and application of certain 
objectives. 
 
As Navarro (2007) demonstrates, this conception of role theory is neither free from criticisms. 
There are four main points that have been held against this interpretation of roles: it is often 
based on a simplistic/simplified psychology; it has a reduced capacity of explaining 
behaviours (it is very often tautological in its explanations); the origin of preferences are 
hardly ever clarified (we can observe the preferences but with difficulty explain why they are 
the way they are); feelings and emotions are not considered rational (p. 255).  
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This last criticism is perhaps the most important for our study and research question because 
it opens a door that links subjective emotions to objective career goals. In that sense it is not 
antonymic to think that one adopts a role for pleasure and for career ambitions. We could go 
as far as to say that there is nothing irrational in taking pleasure of playing a role we know will 
offer us opportunities to fulfil our « hidden » ambitions. In this sense, we perfectly convey 
with Searing when he argues that « the roles politicians construct around their objective are 
usually constructed reasonably (…). They evaluate the outcome of their performance and, in 
this light, adjust both their preferences and the behaviours and attitudes associated with these 
preferences » (Searing 1991: 1255). We should therefore trust politicians to know why they 
act the way they do as the motivational approach considers that « politicians reflect self-
consciously on their principal political role because such roles are the framework of their 
careers » (Searing 1991: 1255). There should not be any contradictions in taking an approach 
that covers emotions as well as future objectives for higher offices. 
 
I argue that emotions and pleasure can be combined with rational career goals. Moreover, 
these roles act as the reflection of MEPs’ career motivations. Therefore, this study proposes to 
investigate to what extent the relation between ambitions and roles is tangible in the 2014 
legislature of the European Parliament, through the case study of the 2014 French delegation 
to the European People’s Party.  
 
III. METHODS FOR GATHERING QUALITATIVE DATA 
 
a) Design of the study 
 
This Master thesis is a case study of the French delegation to the European People’s Party (the 
leading conservative transnational Eurogroup in the EP) in the 2014 legislature, which is a 
« detailed and intensive analysis of a single case » (Bryman 2012 : 66). More precisely, 
Bryman calls this design an exemplifying case because « the objective is to capture the 
circumstances and conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation » (cited in Bryman 
2012: 70). These types of cases are chosen « not because they are extreme or unusual in some 
way but because either they epitomize a broader category of cases or they will provide a 
suitable context for certain research questions to be answered » (Bryman 2012: 70). Like most 
case study design, the inconvenient (or not?) is that the results are hardly generalizable. 
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However, the reasons for conducting a study on this group of 20 parliamentarians are multi-
folded and believed to be appropriate for the scope of the research aim. 
 
As explained briefly below, I argue that ambition can only be fully understood through the 
lenses of national politics. Indeed, if some MEPs’ ambitions are to come back to the national 
political landscape, then we should concentrate on one national delegation to obtain results 
that make sense for MEPs themselves. Moreover, the strategies that MEPs will adopt to reach 
their objectives should be considered through the place that the European market occupies in 
their central political market (Beauvallet 2003). The significance, beliefs and strategies are 
too different from one national delegation to another to obtain good comparable results. 
Focusing on one delegation is also a good way of neutralizing the national dimension of roles 
(Costa et al. 2013). 
 
Concentrating this research on one party group within the French national delegation is also 
argued to be appropriate. First of all, it is a feasible sample to analyse for a Master’s thesis. 
Second, previous research has hardly found that role orientation is affected by political 
orientation (Costa et al. 2013). Individuals are pretty free to interpret their mandate as they 
wish, especially in an institution like the EP which lacks formal constraining rules in the 
matter (Costa et al. 2009, Beauvallet 2009). Moreover, as Hix et al. (1999) argues, we should 
expect these MEPs to act even more deliberately than their Socialists counterpart for example, 
because their party is not sitting in the government. Therefore their political orientation is less 
a « burden » than for these other MEPs. This delegation is also composed of members who 
possess a wide range of different leadership position within the institution (bureau of the 
Parliament and party group, chairs of committees and delegation, coordinators) which fits 
well in Searing’s models of preference and position roles. In addition, my position as a 
researcher/parliamentary assistant allowed me to have valuable access to a group of MEPs 
who normally are very hard to get: ambition is a sensible topic for politicians (especially in 
France), and that a group of MEP accepted delivering information on this area with me is a 
real opportunity for researchers. Last but not least, there has never been, to my knowledge, 
any scholarly paper written on samples like this one: whereas it is not uncommon to find in 
the literature analyses on national delegations in the EP (on the French one especially: 
Beauvallet 2007; Kauppi 1996, 1999), nothing has been written specifically on the political 
groups which compose these delegations. Finally, the 2014 legislature has barely started its 
activities and an academic paper dedicated to it could become a good starting-point for future 
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contributions. Therefore, focusing on the French delegation to the EPP seems a reasonable 
option for our enquiry and for practicalities. 
 
The method for gathering qualitative data was done by conducting semi-structured interviews 
with respondents. The respondents were the MEPs of the delegation themselves. Silverman 
(2011) calls this method emotionalist interviews. The aim of these types of interviews is not 
so much to obtain objective facts but rather to elicit authentic accounts of subjective 
experience (2011: 174). Interviewers’ particular concern is with the lived experience of their 
respondents and for this purpose « emotions are treated as central to such experience » (2011: 
175). Because I use Searing’s motivational approach to conduct this study (which stresses the 
importance of emotional incentives), this specific type of interview seemed particularly 
relevant to lead my enquiries. Moreover, this method allows respondents to use their unique 
ways of defining the world and to raise important issues not contained in the schedule (cited 
in Silverman 2011: 176). This is fruitful because I aimed at creating categories from what my 
respondents told me and this should be done in the most unbiased way as possible. 
 
As done by Beauvallet et al. (2010) and Navarro (2009), I also gathered quantitative data 
based on the MEPs’ « political biographies » (age, gender, constituency, position in the EP, 
other ongoing electoral mandate, responsibilities in their home party/political group/EPP, 
former political/national responsibilities, relevant previous professional experience) which I 
used to clarify or explain certain tendencies one could observe from one respondent to another 
(see Table 1 in Appendix).  
 
b) Samplings procedures 
 
Ideally I would have interviewed the 20 MEPs of the delegation. However it was hardly 
feasible and therefore I fixed myself the objective of conducting eight respondent interviews, 
which I eventually managed to do. Knowing the general reluctance of French politicians to be 
interviewed by social scientists (Costa et al. 2013) and the sensible/polemical aspect of the 
research topic, this is an excellent result. Combining these interviews with quantitative 
information gives a more complete picture for my investigation. Moreover, several studies 
have given conclusive results by conducting a limited number of interviews: Rozenberg’s 
study of French and British Presidents of EU committees in their respective national 
parliaments is composed of only six interviews (2009) and manages to create convincing role 
categories. In the same vein, Rasmussen’s article on the Danish delegation in the EP (2008) 
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brings new light to the voting behaviour of MEPs by conducting a limited amount of 
interviews. Size should therefore not be an issue to conduct a good analysis. 
 
I collected my data through strategic and purposive sampling because the case chosen 
illustrates some feature or process in which I am interested in (Silverman 2011: 388). It is a 
non-probability form of sampling which is made in a strategic manner so that those sampled 
are relevant to the research questions that are being posed (Bryman 2012: 418). I actually 
resort to two samplings to analyse MEPs role orientation: first, I choose to look at the French 
delegation to the EPP. I argue that a study of the 20 parliamentarians who constitutes this 
group can be relevant for larger and transferable enquiries about MEPs roles. Second, I 
choose to conduct only a limited amount of interviews among these 20 parliamentarians (with 
the achievement of 8 interviews).  
 
There were two reasons for this: first, there are too many categories within the sample to 
divide it accordingly and to be sure that the isolated « variable » would be decisive to explain 
role orientation. For instance, we could categorize the sample by the position these MEPs 
occupy in the EP; we could separate MEPs who before their European mandate were French 
local politicians or ministers; or we could divide them by age categories as previous research 
has shown that it affects ambition (Hain 1974, Meserve et al. 2009). However, we assume 
that all MEPs are career ambitious even if they do not aim towards the same goals: whether 
one simply wishes for re-election or another to become (again) a Minister does not change the 
essence of this study. Moreover, we can hardly know for what career they aim before 
interviewing them and it would therefore not make any sense to divide them in pre-
established typologies. Second, and on the field of practicalities, one can hardly be picky 
when it comes to selection procedures with politicians: they are very busy people and MEPs 
especially travel a lot during their mandate (between their constituencies, Brussels and 
Strasbourg for the least). They are hard to reach and, unless having good connections with the 
party, the opportunity to interview them is hazardous. In this sense, using strategic and 
purposive sampling was the most plausible way of obtaining as much interviews as possible. 
 
c) Analytical approach and conduct of the analysis  
 
The study is by nature abductive because it aims at « generating social scientific accounts 
from social actors’ accounts » (Ong 2010: 1). This means that « the researcher grounds a 
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theoretical understanding of the contexts and the people he is studying in the language, 
meanings, and perspectives that form their worldview » (Bryman 2012: 401). As Ong 
demonstrates, grounded concepts in the form of typologies are generated through the use of 
abductive logic (2010: 1). Moreover, the added-value of an abductive reasoning in 
comparison to broader inductive approaches is that the theoretical account is grounded in the 
worldview of those one researched : the results and categories of my studies do not only make 
sense for social scientists but also for the parliamentarians themselves. For example, Navarro 
(2009) draws his categories specialist and intermediary from what MEPs told him and how 
they described themselves (or others). This is precisely what this thesis sought to do with 
respondent semi-structured interviews. 
 
Even though there already are typologies of MEPs from different legislature and 
categorization of MPs and US congressmen in the literature, the thesis does not aim at testing 
them on new material. The reasons for this are four-folded: first, interviews are not known to 
be a good method to test previous hypotheses. My sample is moreover too small to give some 
good representative result. Second, as Bale et al. (2006) argues, roles are dynamic and, in its 
motivational acceptation, they change, or for the least evolve with new actors. Roles are not 
established within the institution and, as we know, the EP is an institution permanently 
evolving and gaining new powers, new members and new prerogatives: these changes affect 
role orientation. However, this does not signify that roles are not valuable means to measure 
politicians' behaviours, but rather that the suggestions of the empirical findings should be 
dealt with precaution. Third and strongly linked to the second argument, the EP, as some 
claim, is at each legislature a « new parliament »: it is characterized with important turnover 
and considerable amount of « freshmen » MEPs (Marrel & Payre 2006). That is also the case 
for the French delegation to the EPP: these new members come with pre-established 
behavioural patterns and these can probably change throughout their mandate. This is why it 
is important to say that the study is viable at a certain point in time (the beginning of the 2014 
legislature) and that previous research is probably not always accurate to describe changes. 
Fourth, most research has been conducted on members of national parliaments (Searing’s is 
on the British House of Commons in the 1990’s; Rozenberg’s on the late French National 
Assembly). There has been a strong argument among structural constructivists that the EP 
should be treated as an idiosyncratic chamber with a very peculiar work-culture that 
differentiates it from most parliaments. MEPs position themselves in the field as « experts » 
and they more or less share the same characteristics: a technical mastery of files, a diplomatic 
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management of processes and the strong capacity to negotiate between groups and institutions 
(Beauvallet & Michon 2012: 130-1). This means that creating categories without taking into 
account their particularities would not make any sense. 
 
However, the analysis will be strongly inspired by this previous research in at least two ways: 
first, because it cannot be ignored that Searing and Navarro’s typologies are extremely 
important contributions to the field. Their findings will be used as a compass to make sure 
that my results are not too far-off from what has been done before me. It would not come as a 
surprise if I end up with more or less the same categories (most likely because some are 
intrinsically linked to the function of parliamentarians: trustees, delegates, or constituency 
men for example). Second, because their methods will be used as a point of departure for my 
analysis. For instance, the first part of my interview guide is strongly inspired by the one used 
by Navarro (2007) and Searing (1994) in their studies of MPs role orientation. My 
contribution is however to use these first questions on a new material (ten to twenty years 
separate my study from theirs) and with a new variable: ambition. 
 
The overall contribution of this study is to explore how the (independent) variable 
« ambition » affects the (dependent) variable « role » of MEPs from the French delegation to 
the EPP in a qualitative perspective. Whereas most studies have analysed ambitions 
retrospectively (from the perspective of career paths) and quantitatively (by analysing voting 
behaviours), this thesis is principally interested by how politicians argue, motivate and 
interpret their ambitions and how they link it to their representative roles. In other words, the 
study conducts a narrative analysis because it seeks at analysing the story that MEPs tell and 
share (Silverman 2011: 75-82). With narrative analysis, the focus of attention is « how do 
people make sense of what happened and to what effect? » because stories are nearly always 
told with a purpose in mind (Bryman 2012: 582). Even though narrative analysis is often used 
for life history research, its use can be much broader than this. Answers that people provide in 
qualitative interviews can be viewed « as stories that are potential fodder for a narrative 
analysis » (Bryman 2012: 582). How MEPs situate their mandate within their careers and 
ambitions and argues for it does constitute a story. In the end, it does not really matter if they 
achieve their goals or not. As Searing puts it, we should trust politicians to « reflect self-
consciously on their principal political role because such roles are the framework of their 
careers » (1991: 1255). It also means that the only good way to know their career orientations 
is to actually ask them. This is in parallel the most difficult task of this project: why would 
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politicians accept to deliver me their « secret » ambitions? Why would they tell me where 
they (really) wish to project themselves in the future?  
 
As we saw, MEPs can follow several career paths: stay in the EP, leave the EP to go back 
home, or end their careers in the EP as Scarrow (1997) would argue. An important amount of 
the (American/Anglo-Saxon) literature argues that these paths are influenced by their 
ambitions (discrete, static, progressive or intrainstitutional (Herrick et al. 1993)). These are 
the « independent » variables that affect role orientation. Now the question is: how do we 
know that it is actually these career ambitions that affect their practices in the EP? How do 
we know that their role orientation is not influenced by any other things, such as pleasure, for 
example? It thus must be clear in the interview guide that the prioritization they make of 
certain tasks, their support to certain « principals » (home party, EP group, the constituents) 
are guided by these ambitions. This was done by asking them in follow-up questions « Do you 
think of X principal when you choose to focus on this aspect of your legislative work? ». The 
question of whom they think of when they act can also be addressed this way: « In your 
opinion, what differentiates a good from a bad MEP? Why? ». In the end, I gathered 
sufficiently convincing material to construct ideal-types. This is the method used by Searing 
and Navarro (strongly inspired by Max Weber) to dress typologies of MEPs. It is also a good 
way to insure that the categories are mutually exclusive. One good way to distinguish one 
particular pattern of behaviour from one MEP to another was to ask them: « Generally 
speaking, what are the most important tasks of an MEP? ». We should, for example, expect 
MEPs interested in a promotion within the institution to prioritize concrete legislative work, 
specialize in one domain (if they wish for instance to become President of a Committee), 
while those interested by a national career should feel more obliged to their constituents, act 
as an intermediary or spend more time in Paris with the home party than participating to the 
work in Brussels. 
 
A quick example to illustrate an archetypical role one can find in the literature on the EP: the 
animator as he is described by Navarro (2009). Animators are characterised by their primary 
interests for « major issues » to the opposition of specialists who focus on expertise and 
specific topics. Animators describe the EP as a place for exchange and debate and their 
principal legislative activities consist in speaking during plenary sessions and political groups 
meetings. They typically seat in prestigious committees such as Foreign Affairs and 
Constitutional Affairs. They privilege the most political position of the EP such as the bureau 
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or leadership position in their groups. During the interviews, they explain how much pleasure 
they take in exercising their mandate and the personal dimension of this experience, which 
represents sources of self-fulfilment (p. 483-6). However, not much is known towards which 
goals these roles are adopted for and to which purpose they serve. In the end, beyond the mere 
description of categories of roles, the thesis aims at restoring these behaviours within career 
trajectories, differentiated ambitions and strategic purposes. 
 
Many more examples can be find and used in Hix et al. (1999) and Navarro (2007, 2009) to 
motivate these orientations. Additional information could have been used by looking at if they 
attend sessions, write reports or table amendments but, because we are only at the beginning 
of the legislature, the statistics would not have made any sense. Also, it is not so much in the 
essence of a qualitative study to watch these aspects as it has already done many times before 
by quantitative researchers (Hix et al. 2013; Meserve et al. 2009). 
 
d) Ideal-types 
 
As mentioned above, one of the principal tool for gathering convincing qualitative data and 
instruments to efficiently distinguish one MEP from another in categories, is the creation of 
ideal-types. The answers given by the respondents during the semi-structured interviews 
allow us to situate their roles as well as their ambitions. In addition, confronting this material 
to the « political biographies » of each interviewee enables us to establish different ideal-
types. This method of analysis is fruitful and useful for several reasons. 
 
In one sense, an approach by ideal-type is the next logical step that follows a paper based on 
role theory. Whereas in classical American political science scholarship MEPs or 
Congressmen are first and foremost treated as individuals who evolve quite independently in 
institutional settings, a parliamentary role approach considers that roles are the fruit of a 
meeting between subjectivity and a social position (Navarro 2009 : 481). This type of 
consideration therefore avoids analyses which are strictly based on biographical conducts or 
voting behaviours. To the opposite of most mainstream research on the behaviours of MEPs, 
role theory uncovers the daily complexities of parliamentary practices and refutes analyses 
strictly based on voting behaviours. The argument is the following : a social position is not 
composed by as much models of conduct than people occupying it, and therefore a limited 
amount of models should emerge because actors attach themselves in a privileged manner to 
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one function or another based on their interests, values or ambitions (Navarro 2009 : 481). 
With the analysis of the data, we will establish these limited amounts of models in ideal-
types. That is precisely the method used by Navarro and Searing (1994).  
 
While Navarro (2009) constitutes his ideal-types by confronting different types of material 
(semi-structured interviews, quantitative data and in situ observations), this thesis focuses 
almost exclusively on the semi-structured interviews to create the ideal-types. The 
background of the MEPs are not used like in Navarro’s doctoral thesis (2007) to confirm 
intuitions or models, but rather to add complementary information to one particular 
behaviour. Moreover, the greatest originality of this explorative study is that roles are created 
not solely on the basis of the MEPs unique conception of their mandate, but in priority on 
their career ambitions. The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate that an approach by ideal-type 
based on ambition is a sustainable method to explain differences of behaviours and conduct in 
the EP.  
 
As Searing (1994) elegantly argues: « Typologies make diversity intelligible by squeezing out 
the idiosyncratic. When they become too abstract, however, they lose their explanatory 
grounding. Thus, in studying political behaviour, it is desirable to tether typologies to the 
constructs that are actually in the minds of the political actors being studied » (p. 411). The 
thesis is abductive and therefore it seems logical that the constructed ideal-types should also 
make sense for the respondents interviewed: the MEPs. However with this approach, roles are 
primarily understood as abstractions whose key features are deliberately exaggerated in order 
to highlight what is most characteristic about each and every one and their specificities 
(Navarro 2009 : 482). It should therefore not be too much of a surprise that during the 
empirical analysis not one single MEP strictly belonged to one ideal-type. There is no 
contradiction in that and the opposite would have been quite surprising. Moreover, MEPs 
cannot be stereotyped into one type of ambition or one role category: to refute these branches 
of analyses was the initial intention and key ambition of this Master’s thesis. Finally, ideal-
types possess the advantage of not being stricto sensu analytical categories: without 
quantitative triangulation means, the categories established would pass with difficulty the 
fence of scientific reliability. In that sense, the explorative dimension of the thesis does not 
allow us to go further than the creation of broader interpretative and inductive ideal-types. 
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e) Coding ambitions and roles  
 
How was the data gathered? How do we know when a role-type emerges? When do 
mentioned career-orientations constitute an ambition? To answer these questions, the thesis 
arms itself with different analytical tools and means of coding. 
 
First of all, the thesis is strictly based on eight semi-structured respondent interviews with 
members of the French delegation to the EPP in the 2014-2019 legislature. Each interview 
was conducted in the MEPs’ offices in Brussels or in Strasbourg (see Appendix a). They were 
unanimously held in French. The length of the interviews varies: the shortest one lasted 15 
minutes and the longest one 45 minutes. In general, interviews were 27 minutes long and each 
of them were tape-recorded then transcribed. The quotations of their answers are personal 
translations: the original quotes are in the Appendix (c). MEPs were guaranteed anonymity 
even though, to one exception, none of them made any remarks related to this issue. Five 
interviews were conducted in Strasbourg and because of the architecture of the offices, each 
MEPs assistant were there during the interviews. Objectively, this did not seem to influence 
the content of their answers even though some of them would now and then mention, evoke 
or joke around with their parliamentary assistants. For example, the parliamentary assistant of 
interviewee n°7 shortly participated in the discussion to clarify a point. Generally, every 
interviewees were administered the same questions and followed the same schedule of 
interview. Unfortunately, because of the lack of time for some of them, certain questions were 
deliberately omitted. This was specially the case with question n°4 of theme n°1 (see 
Appendix b). However, each respondent had questions concerning their ambitions and 
answered them. Not one single interviewee refused to answer a question.  
 
Like Searing (1994) preconizes, « each Member of Parliament was approached, in other 
words, as a respondent whose general views would be used, along with the views of 
colleagues, to reconstruct the institutional context. But each was also approached as an expert 
informant whose particular experiences (which had been researched before the interview 
began) could help illuminate specific aspects of the parliamentary system » (p. 405-406). As 
mentioned previously, the interview guide was strongly inspired by the one used by Navarro 
(2007) and Searing (1994) in order to develop a motivational approach to role while at the 
same time developing a unique set of questions on their career motivations. We therefore do 
not completely convey with Searing’s double approach of respondent/informant interviews: in 
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our opinion, they are principally means to uncover politicians’ interpretation, argumentation 
and disclosure of their ambitions. Therefore, a respondent approach was enough to obtain 
satisfying data. Were they truthful however? Searing believes that interviews conducted on a 
« nonattribution basis » or anonymity facilitates frankness and that most interview’s topics 
which concerns institutional matters, career information or beliefs are simply too abstract to 
seem politically sensitive (1994: 408). This might be true in an Anglo-Saxon context and 
when questions do not mention directly ambition, but it should be considered with precaution 
in this Master thesis. Vague answers or sometimes initial rejection of the questions influenced 
the way ambition was analysed and processed for the purpose of this paper. In other words, 
how the MEPs' answers were coded is primordial for the well-being of this study. 
 
Coding consists generally in two phases (Bryman 2012). First, the unstructured material must 
be categorized. « For example, with answers to an open question, this means that the 
researcher must examine people’s answers and group them into different categories » (p. 
247). Answers to the interview guide constitute the unstructured material. The guide is 
divided in two themes: the first is composed of specific questions about MEPs roles (their 
motivations to become an MEP, their duties and responsibilities, their representative role, the 
importance of their mandate, their satisfaction and frustration about their mandate). Answers 
to these questions where then set into a table and MEPs were divided by shared answers (see 
Table 2 in Appendix). The same was done with the second theme of the interview 
guide which focuses specifically on MEPs’ ambitions (see Table 4 in the Discussion section). 
Questions about which position MEPs would like to seek, eventual candidacy to upcoming 
elections and where they generally saw themselves in the years to come, generated answers 
that were then processed in a table to identify each MEP’s specific ambitions. To simplify the 
task and to discuss directly with the literature, Schlesinger (1966) and Herrick’s (1993) 
concepts were used to distinguish MEPs: they could either be discrete, static, 
intrainstitutional or progressive ambitious. Specifically concerning this theme, the 
inconvenient of this method called post-coding is that it can be an unreliable process because 
« it can introduce the possibility of variability in the coding of answers and therefore of 
measurement error (and hence lack of validity) » (Bryman 2012: 247). However, answers to 
theme 1 and theme 2 were then processed and matched to create the ideal-types. In other 
words, each ideal-type assembles together MEPs who share the same roles and the same 
ambitions. As the analysis and discussion section elaborates later, three ideal-types were 
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empirically found within the delegation: the European Animator, the French Politician and 
the Local Specialist.  
 
To uncover preference roles and their players, Searing recalls to a « special methodology » 
(1994: 411). We employed the same methodology because, like Searing, we presumed that 
« politicians’ roles are usually driven by goals: career goals and emotional incentives » (p. 
412). Whereas he focuses nearly exclusively on the incentives of players through the pleasure 
they take in exercising their positions and functions, our coding efforts concentrated 
specifically on career goals. « We wished to understand what backbenchers understood to be 
the motivational foci of backbench roles, what they understood to be the set of desires that 
guided them and their colleagues in organizing their work at Westminster » argues the author 
(p. 412). The approach is similar to the one described in the previous paragraph : for example 
Searing describes how he asked backbenchers to characterize the broadest and most 
significant aspects of their work in order to develop their purposive role : « backbenchers 
typically respond by describing what they do in terms of why they do it » (p. 412). This is 
precisely what was done all along this thesis, with a special focus on ambition, to gather good 
qualitative data. 
 
f) Generalizability, reliability, validity and ethics  
 
Generalizability is not the main aim of this Master thesis. It is hard to assume that my results 
would have consequences for all of the members of the EP. Moreover, studies based on 
interviews are not known to be particularly efficient to generalize. As Bryman (2012) argues, 
« purposive sampling does not allow the researcher to generalize to a population » (p. 418). 
We can only say that they are strong points of departure and that they would be worth to 
invest in deeper research in this area. Indeed, we could easily argue that all politicians are 
ambitious and that they all adopt concrete and differentiated roles in the hemi-cycle. Small 
samples can sometimes yield big insights and if this is verified for an important amount of our 
sample, why would it not be true for all of the other MEPs? Transferability could therefore be 
expected from my findings because, as Silverman puts it (2011), « by thoroughly examining a 
small number of cases, the researcher may explore in-depth the contextual dimensions that 
influence a social phenomenon » (p. 392). Eight strategically sampled interviews are not 
enough to generalize, but they are however to assume that the results could be transferred to 
wider groups (the whole EPP group or the complete French delegation for example). 
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Reliability should only be expected to a certain point in time. As we know, MEPs’ roles and 
behaviours evolve along the legislatures and we cannot completely expect from them to act 
univocally the same way five years in a row. This is particularly true of « freshmen » MEPs 
who are known to have adaptive behaviours (Lindstädt et al. 2012; Bale et al. 2006). Also, 
these roles can be shaped by other external factors correlated to their ambitions: the best 
example is the one of upcoming elections. The closer they get to desired elections (may it be 
the 2017 French presidential elections or the mid-term EP elections which decides who gets 
appointed to what position in the assembly), the more acute becomes their roles. However, 
two arguments go in favour of the reliability of this study: « important » elections are too far 
to drastically change our MEPs behaviours (maybe to the exception of the 2015 French 
regional elections: but do they represent promotion and are they worth of their ambitions? 
Moreover, not one single respondent openly admitted that he or she would be a candidate). 
Second, the motivational approach to roles expects to a great extent that the preferences and 
incentives that politicians use in adapting to their institution are acquired before they take 
their post (Searing 1991: 1247-8). This explains why politicians are generally consistent along 
the legislature and from one chamber to another. This also justifies why most role theory 
studies end up with close categories. Constrained or not, in the end there are not thousands of 
way to act or interact for parliamentarians. 
 
Finally, how do we know that it really is ambition that affects role orientation and how do we 
know that MEPs were « truthful » with me during the interviews? How do we validate my 
results? For the first part, the interview guide is done as such that ambition is isolated as an 
explanatory factor for role orientation. If interviews were conducted well, they should have 
given valid results. Moreover collecting, as mentioned before, quantitative data and checking 
that my results do correlate with previous assumptions one can find in the literature, are good 
indicators of the validity of my results. The personal background of MEPs is in a way useful 
to keep in mind: we could expect that a former-minister’s ambition is to become a minister 
again and that he/she uses his/her European mandate for such purpose. This should be 
particularly true for freshmen MEPs who failed to be elected at the national level and who use 
their mandate as a stepping-stone and as way to stay in the national political landscape. 
Secondly, as Searing advocates, we should trust politicians when they talk of themselves to be 
truthful: it is after all on what they base their career. The « truthfulness » of their about is 
linked to the « ethical » issues of the thesis: I expected them to be more truthful to me than 
 35 
with other social scientists because I was part of the « tribe ». In this sense, my position of 
parliamentary assistant was a strength for the purpose of this thesis. The success of my 
enquiries was therefore strongly linked to my position and to my connections with the 
different members of the staff of the French delegation. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The empirical analysis based on the semi-structured interviews and on the political profiles of 
the respondents enables us to identify three ideal-types of roles and ambitions for the 2014 
French delegation to the European People's Party: the European Animator, the French 
Politician and the Local Specialist (see Table 3 in Appendix). These semantic and theoretical 
constructions are the fruit of an abductive approach and the result of specific sets of ambitions 
and roles. In this sense, even though each interviewed MEPs do not strictly belong to one 
category, each ideal-type is nonetheless mutually exclusive. The ideal-types demonstrate how 
differently parliamentarians understand their mandates and their roles and how they relate 
them directly to their ambitions and career plans. As the chapter shows, this relation roles-
ambition is present in at least three different ways in the French delegation and acts as a 
primordial distinguisher of MEPs. 
 
a) The European Animator 
 
The first role model that the interviews enable us to identify is the one of the « European 
animator ». To a large extent, the name of this ideal-type as well as his defining 
characteristics are inspired by the model developed by Julien Navarro in his doctoral thesis 
and following articles (2007 ; 2009). Whereas Navarro’s « animator » is principally defined 
by the way he or she understands the EP as a political institution and how an MEP should 
conduct and interact within this institution, our « European animator » distinguished itself 
from other respondents during the interviews by the way he/she made clear that he/she could 
only conceive his political career as a European one. Interviewee n°1, n°3 and to a lesser 
extent n°8 are the respondents who correspond the most with this model. 
 
The first crucial distinguishing factor of this category is how motivated European animators 
were to become Members of the European Parliament. Whereas most interviewees, when 
asked « Could you start by telling me how did you first become an MEP? What were your 
initial motivations? »  usually hesitated to answer before presenting their mandate as an 
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opportunity that was offered to them, European animators made clear that MEP is a position 
for which they fought and which makes sense in their own political trajectories. For example, 
respondent n°1 to show how motivated he was to become an MEP stated that: 
 
« I chose, and to my knowledge (but maybe you will find in the framework of your research 
other cases) I am the only French politician who, deliberately at a time where the law did not 
oblige him to, abandoned a non-negligible national political career and abandoned the most 
beautiful of political mandate, which is to be mayor. » 
 
In this sense, European animators consider being an MEP as a position worthy in itself, which 
might explain why none of the respondents of the sample exercise any other electoral 
mandates. Moreover, this ideal-type argues for proof of his motivation by fitting his mandate 
in a narrative which makes sense considering his own political and personal trajectory. For 
instance, respondent n°3 links her mandate back to her family origin, her life as a student in 
Strasbourg when the European Parliament was first elected in 1979 and how this event had a 
huge importance later for her professional life: 
 
« The familial factor plus the territorial factor (since I lived for a long time in Strasbourg) 
had as a consequence that I was always interested with European topics, I was always 
interested with what was happening in the backyard of our neighbours and I was always very 
attached to the European project, across the French-German reconciliation, so… So it always 
interested me. But after that, my professional and personal path has followed diversified and 
varied evolutions, depending on the people I met, depending on the possibilities (I tried 
seizing opportunities each time) even though I had the opportunity to anchor for quite some 
time, but not all along, my professional and personal path in the shadow of someone, (A.L), 
(because I was his collaborator), who himself discovered the importance of the European 
project at the same time he was progressing along his political career, and so there was this 
red thread of my interest for Europe who was extended. » 
 
 
In the same vein, every respondent demonstrated how hard they had to fight within their 
home-party in order to get a good position on the electoral lists. This was specially the case 
for respondent n°3 and n°8, whom were not the initial preferred choice of the members of 
their party. To her own acknowledgment, interviewee n°3 had to be very strategic and tactical 
and invest a lot of time and effort to obtain an eligible position: 
 
« And then I went around trying to convince, to find allies, because there is a national 
commission for investiture and the number of people you have to convince is quite limited and 
so, braced with my single hardiness and with the real but tenuous encouragements of my 
hierarchy, I went to convince the head of parties and the different members of the national 
commission for investiture of the UMP. And I eventually ended up in a good position on the 
list: it was quite complicated; there were a lot of varied and diversified sequences. I found 
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myself finally…I did a bit of tactic : that I knew how to, it is part of my professional « savoir-
faire » I would say, I did some tactic, a bit of strategy to foil others and …And so finally I 
managed to get rid of some women competitors and I ended up in 6th position on the list. » 
 
European animators have a particular conception of their mandate and of their duties and 
responsibilities which distinguishes them from other respondents. First and foremost, what 
defines an MEP in their opinion is his investment in the legislative activity of the institution. 
More precisely, three elements kept coming back during the interviews concerning the 
legislative work: the most important tasks are to exercise influence by following the work in 
the committees, fighting to obtain as much reports as possible and amending texts. This is 
what respondent n°8 explains when he argues that: 
 
« Within the legislative work, the most important is to try to…as the initiative of laws goes to 
the Commission. We are not at the initiative of laws. Our work consists in modifying and 
amending them. And that is what I try to do. Besides, I believe I am one of the 50 MEPs who, 
since the beginning of the mandate, have tabled the most amendments, whatever the text is. It 
is a power of modification but to do it efficiently you need to study in-depth each texts and be 
surrounded with collaborators who are on the same line as you, and that is what makes you 
progress. » 
 
Due to the organization of the institution, obtaining good and influential reports is often the 
results of long negotiations within the group, and it requires commitment to the institution and 
working hard within its lines. In this sense, European animators consider "rapporteurship" as 
the most prestigious mean to exercise influence in the European Parliament. It is the most 
valuable mean to acquire because it opens and gives access to the « keys » of the functioning 
of the institution. For example, respondent n°1 argues that: 
 
« The only person who knows completely the topic is the rapporteur. And therefore if you are 
a rapporteur, even if you belong to a small group, you can have an influence on the content of 
texts which is unique. » 
 
Because they conceive their career essentially through an European scope, European 
animators will privilege acquiring « means » that will present value on the European 
« market » and exercising responsibilities in their group (Presidency of a Special Committee, 
EPP Coordinator to a Committee) and in their delegations (Presidency, Vice-Presidency) in 
order to acquire a double type of legitimacy : proving their commitment to their European 
peers while at the same time showing their loyalty to their home-party in order to satisfy their 
ambitions. It should therefore not come as too much as a surprise that when asked « As an 
MEP, who do you represent ? », only one interviewee of the three respondents composing this 
 38 
ideal-type answered that he represents all of the citizens of the European Union. It is 
nonetheless surprising because European animators are well aware of the juridical 
roundabouts of the Treaties, but still consider that they are committed to the constituency that 
elected them. Respondent n°3 summarizes perfectly this ambiguity: 
 
« We are… it is a bit ambiguous…at the same time the representatives of the citizens of the 
Union whose aspirations, demands, hopes we carry, but at the same time, a bit in priority, we 
carry the demands, the aspirations, the messages of demands, the angers, etc., the 
interrogations of our constituents who are our national electorate. Therefore it is a bit 
ambiguous, we are MEPs but at the same time we are French MEPs. » 
 
This ambiguity can only make sense if we consider the ambitions of European animators: 
mostly static, and for some intrainstitutional, these MEPs cannot act in isolation of their 
home-party and of their electorate. This explains why European animators also exercise 
important responsibilities in their home-party (member of the political bureau, member of the 
national council, national functional secretary responsible for a specific theme in the party): 
because of the mode of designation for European elections, it is essential that they exercise 
responsibilities that will enable them to convince their party of their added-value. 
 
A key characteristic of European animators is the satisfaction they take out of their mandate 
and the importance they give to it. Unanimously, this ideal-type considers being an MEP 
extremely important for the well-being of society as a whole. They often describe the 
European Parliament as a career arena in itself where very important decisions are being 
taken. They describe the EP as a place where the projects of the future are being discussed, 
and much earlier than in the arrogant French National Assembly, which is essentially 
composed of « drama queens » MPs whose only power is to shout. Respondent n°8 describes 
this phenomenon in a nutshell when stating that: 
 
« Well to a pretty simple extent, it is that between 60 and …it depends which years, it depends 
which sources you refer to, but we consider that between 60 and 80% of law texts which are 
laws, decrees, regulations which will be applied in France, are in fact the transposition of 
application of texts which were decided in the European Parliament. So this gives you an idea 
of the influence and the importance of the choices we have to make here, even though in the 
media not much people realize it. » 
 
They have the feeling of doing real politics in the EP to the contrary of the National Assembly 
where:  
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« Rather than in France if you are in the opposition, you have one power it is to shout and 
nobody cares, and if you are in the majority, you have one power, it is to shut up, because the 
texts of the governments have to pass, which says « Article I : the government is always right. 
Article II: if you are not happy and that you are a member of its majority, please refer to 
Article I! ». That’s all: summary of the Fifth’s Republic Constitution for the National 
Assembly. » 
 
European animators share the same frustrations concerning their mandate. They have the 
feeling that it is not sufficiently acknowledged by the French media and political class. They 
stress that this is principally due to the "Presidentialisation" of the French Fifth Republic 
where most political commentators prefer focusing on the Presidential campaign and national 
elections rather than by what is happening in the « boring » European Parliament. Being a 
former Minister, Interviewee n°1 considers that when he chose to exclusively focus on his 
European mandate he became bound to take a « vow of media virginity ». He cruelly 
summarizes how EU politics is perceived in France the following way:  
 
« Nobody gives a damn. Nobody cares except the French media and political class. And so in 
all of that mess, Europe is covered not even like a sport’s rubric (because sport actually 
interests people, at least football), neither like the cultural rubric (because a certain amount 
of people are interested by culture), but I would say like the scientific rubric!  « There are 
specialists, which I am sure are good people, but all of this is really boring to say the least! ». 
So we do talk about it because some newspapers have to do it. Nevertheless, that is a real 
frustration which is not only psychological and for my own self-esteem. » 
 
On the other hand, European animators share the same satisfaction concerning their mandate. 
The particular facets of a life in Brussels are what primarily contribute to their self-fulfilment 
through this position. They unanimously stress how enriching it is to work in a multicultural 
and multinational environment, how intellectually stimulating it is to evolve and interact with 
meaningful persons and contacts. They also stress how much the political game is more 
interesting in the European Parliament than in France and particularly in the National 
Assembly. This is summarized by respondent n°1 when he says that: 
 
« And why I chose the mandate of European parliamentarian rather than the mandate of 
national parliamentarian, is because of the capacity we have here, that an MEP has, if he 
works well, his political work included (in the positive appreciation of the term): he can build 
his own majority, he can have an important influence on the substance of reports, but what is 
also interesting here, it is this possibility to evolve surrounded by enriching contacts. » 
 
European parliamentarians are free from the classical left-right constraints of the French 
political game which, in their opinion, makes the National Assembly a useless institution, a 
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« theatre of shadows » and a « Commedia dell’arte » as it is ironically described by 
Interviewee n°3.  Quite the opposite, the European Parliament and EU politics in general are 
perceived as a « civilised method of governance » by Interviewee n°8. This is what makes the 
mandate so « fun » in the opinion of respondent n°3: 
 
« There, we are free from purely politician and political constraints, and we work on the basis 
of…we do real politics here. You need alliances, we look for agreements, and we work the 
European «pastry» to move along together: what is interesting is that no parliamentary group 
has a majority alone but we are permanently in the construction of a strategy of alliances. 
And so once again that is intellectually exciting, fun, there…it’s real politics! We are not in 
the pavlovian reflex; we are in the political construction of agreements and compromise like 
we say in this house. » 
 
The fact that two out of the three MEPs who constitute this ideal-type are incumbent MEPs 
might explain how much pleasure they take in evolving in this institution, whose internal 
mechanisms are often complex. It is foremost an institution in which they feel comfortable 
and which they consider like a home. Moreover, this might explain why, during the 
interviews, European animators are the MEPs who are the most opened about their ambitions. 
This is also probably due to the fact that their ambitions are intrinsically linked to the 
institution in itself, making it more legitimate to talk about it rather than if they were counting 
on leaving soon the European Parliament.  
 
As stated before, European animators have European ambitions. When asked where they see 
themselves in five years or which other position in the EP they would like to occupy, each of 
these MEPs stress their attachment to the institution. For example, respondent n°3 considers it 
evident that she will run again for a seat in the EP five years from now. Indeed, it is part of 
the inner logic of the institution and of her own political trajectory to achieve several 
mandates in the EP: 
 
« Well yes! A lot of people say that you need to achieve three mandates to make the most of it. 
Yes. The formula usually practised by the Germans and by the Brits: a first mandate to 
discover, a second mandate to act, and a third mandate to exercise influence. It’s the 
German-British model. » 
 
In the same vein, respondent n°1, who is incumbent since 1989 in the EP, has, to his own 
acknowledgment, built a strategy only on the basis of a European political career. When asked 
about his ambitions, he tells with disappointment that his life-goal was to actually become a 
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European Commissioner and that for several reasons (including the aforementioned vices of 
the French regime) he will never become one: 
 
I
1: 
The function to which I was candidate and which I never reached was Commissioner. 
PE: Commissioner? 
I
1:
 There, my political objective was to become a European Commissioner. It will never 
happen. 
PE: You will never become one? 
I
1:
 No. You have to be proposed by the President of the Republic and, there, I come back to 
the description I was doing of the monarchic system: you need to lick boots; you have to kiss 
asses… And I do not kiss asses. And so … I do not know…four, five, six times I applied to 
become French Commissioner. Now I will never become one. 
 
Interviewee n°1 evokes that he could also have become the President of the European 
Parliament at the beginning of the legislature if the good conditions had been reunited. He 
also mentions that the seat will be rotating in two years and that he will probably be the 
candidate with the strongest chance. In his opinion, this is due to two factors: his own 
legitimacy as an incumbent and much invested MEP, and the logic of rotating nationalities 
which governs the institution. No French has ruled the EP in a long time and it would only 
seem logic that he becomes the next President of the EP. 
 
To conclude, the European animator distinguishes himself from other role models by his 
strong attachment to the EP, his unique conception of the European mandate, by the 
satisfaction and frustration he draws from being a European parliamentarian and by the way 
he anchors a seat in the EP as a logical step in his own political career. European Animators 
are definitely « EU politics » ambitious.  
 
b) The French Politician 
 
The second role type that the conducted interviews permit us to identify is the one of the 
« French Politician ». This name-tag is not so much a reference to these MEPs’ ambitions 
(which one could foresee as a return to the French national political life after a quick passage 
in the European Parliament) than to the numerous evocations these parliamentarians make 
about being French representatives and the special link that unites them to the French (and 
local) territory. Whereas European animators self-reflect on their own personal political 
trajectories nearly exclusively through a European spectrum, the French Politicians anchor 
their European mandate in an already-long and sometime ongoing French political career. 
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French Politicians MEPs have exercised important responsibilities in the French national 
political sphere (former Minister and MPs) and are exclusively freshmen MEPs. They have a 
particular conception of their mandate which distinguish them drastically from other 
parliamentarians, and a set of ambitions which make the « French Politician » role-category 
pretty unique. Interviewees' n°2 and n°6 are the respondents who correspond the most with 
this role. 
 
The first distinguishing factor of this category is the motivation or rather the lack-of 
motivation that French Politicians have shown to become an MEP. While European animators 
perceive their mandate as « making sense » in reflection to past « European » experiences and 
often they had to fight internally within their party and at home to be candidates for this 
position, French Politicians on the other hand do not show any particular initial motivation or 
previous experience for the position which could justify to have become candidates. When 
asked what motivated him to become an MEP, interviewee n°2 answered in a very straight-
forward tone « Nothing ». In the same vein, interviewee n°6 presents this mandate as an 
opportunity: 
 
« (It was not from your own initiative?) Hum…no. No no no. I would never have imagined to 
plebiscite a mandate like this one. There it’s…the opportunity presented itself, I took it, but it 
is a proposal that was made to me. » 
 
Interestingly, both of these MEPs were asked by their party to be candidates for these 
elections following an electoral defeat in the 2012 legislative elections to the National 
Assembly. To their own acknowledgment, they accepted this proposal from their party 
because it was a good way of coming back to the (national) political life. Interviewee n°2 
justifies his candidacy in the following manner: 
 
« Following the Presidential elections I lost the legislative elections and, because I have a 
professional activity and a complete independence, considering that my own camp betrays me 
is one thing, but that my electorate leaves me is another, I had decided to put an end to my 
political career. That was until my political family the UMP asked me to be the head of the 
list on (this) great region because they considered that I was the best to fight (the National 
Front) and to pull the list. I hesitated a lot, I said yes, and I went back into politics, and I 
ended up a Member of the European Parliament. »  
 
In any case, French Politicians were asked by a third-party to become candidate, whether it is 
the party itself (the UMP) or a former Prime-Minister. They accepted because fighting for 
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their ideas and living for politics is intrinsically linked to their personalities and conditions 
their existence. French Politicians have been MPs for decades before entering the European 
Parliament and this influences importantly the way they perceive their duties and 
responsibilities as EU parliamentarians. Whereas European animators generally are 
incumbent MEPs who believe that what defines a good MEP is his investment in the 
legislative activity of the chamber (being a reporter, tabling amendments, exercising 
responsibilities within Committees or the Group), French Politicians have a much more 
ambiguous and vast conception of their mandate. They have a strategic perception of their 
mandate, choosing the committees in which they seat or the investment in certain types of 
legislative work for a particular reason. Interviewee n°6 understands his role of MEP as 
follows: 
 
« First of all, it’s to do correctly your job, as best as possible, so to be present. And 
hum…after that I have…two goals: first I want to keep the link between the European 
mandate (through the responsibilities I exercise in the committees in which I seat) and the 
local territory. So find a way to make the connection between my territory and the mandate of 
MEP » 
 
They believe that selecting strategic committees and exercising specific responsibilities will 
make the difference when it comes to be influent. Respondent n°2 explains why he chose 
certain positions within the EP: 
 
« Which brings me to action after: to take responsibilities within the delegation: I got myself 
elected Vice-President because it is the political area; to keep my political responsibilities 
within my party: I am a member of the bureau of the UMP, because it is the place where 
decisions are being taken. And ensure that in this new hemicycle I can be in the places and in 
the committees of action. I chose the Transport Committee because I consider that transports 
are important for the movements of goods and people in the entire of Europe. I consider that 
it is important for France who is in the middle of all of the passage. And I consider that it is 
important for my constituency. » 
 
French Politicians are not « ideologists » but consider themselves « pragmatic ». To the 
opposite of European animators who act and vote in function of a project or a long-term 
vision for Europe, the French Politician acts on a case-by-case basis and always with 
« political » considerations in mind. These schemes of interpretations probably explain best 
who they believe they represent as MEPs: first and foremost, France and the French state, and 
in second position, their electorate (whereas European animators represented the constituency 
and citizens of the EU). Respondent n°2 uses the word « Frenchy » to describe himself and 
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respondent n°6 argues that he is first of all a « French MEP, representing France ». French 
Politicians are also the only MEPs of the interviewed sample to mention pan of French 
political life to justify some of their decision-making. For instance, they try to give a 
« political » and national vision to everything they do and they anchor their mandate in 
opposition to other political formation, and more particularly the extreme-right National 
Front. For example, interviewee n°2 is a member of the Committee on Transport and Tourism 
in the EP and explains he chose this committee because it is « very political »: taking as an 
example the Lyon-Turin rail line construction, he argues he chose to work on the topic 
because the Green Party is against it and the Socialists do not have any clear position. In the 
same vein, French Politicians are the only one to clearly indicate that they are representatives 
of the French right-wing and of the right-wing electorate: 
 
« I belong to a right-wing political sensibility which I take responsibility for, in a group with 
our qualities and defects, but I am from the French right-wing. There. I am the representative 
of my electorate. » 
 
These considerations probably also trigger their particular conception of the mandate of a 
European parliamentarian. When asked why they consider being an MEP important for 
society as a whole, French Politicians refer unanimously to the French territory and to the 
pedagogical role of MEPs (especially in relation to the rise of extreme-right during the 2014 
European elections): 
 
« The difficulty that we meet is that, because during an important amount of years, left and 
right, have hit on Europe saying « It’s Europe’s fault », in order to hide our cowardice, 
turpitude, our lack of courage, an absence of decision-making : we do not like the European 
system. And so there is a depreciation of Europe within the population because we have not 
stopped for years hitting on it and now we do not see its utility anymore. As a consequence, in 
the political component, now come populist discourses. » 
 
Interviewee n°6 expresses the exact same views concerning their roles: 
« And to say to the electorate or at least to the citizens that it is useless to let off steam on the 
European elections so that the first French delegation is the one of the National Front. 
Because it does not serve any useful purpose. It does not make any sense here, it is of no use. 
And so it’s to tell them that Europe, there…a ballot is not to laugh around with. We have to 
try to…And when you vote for the National Front, first delegation, it does not reinforce the 
role of France even though it is not the electorate’s intentions. » 
 
In a nutshell, French Politicians, because they act on the behalf of French interests and values, 
give a pedagogical dimension to their mandate: they consider that French citizens should be 
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aware of the importance of Europe for their everyday life and for the prestige of France in 
general. Interestingly, and even though the formula was used by interviewee n°1 whose 
representative style comes closest to the European animator, French Politicians consider 
themselves as « diplomats », representing France in an international arena. The fact that 
respondent n°2 is a former secretary of state of foreign affairs is probably not innocent to why 
he conceives MEPs as representatives of France, even if it means « defending the policies of 
François Hollande which is not always easy considering what he does ! ». This specifically 
French dimension of their mandate is also a motor of the satisfaction they have representing 
their country, and is a crucial distinguishing factor from the other interviewees. Rather than 
satisfaction, French Politicians feel « proud and honoured » to be among the « happy few » 
who have the chance to represent their country. Whereas European animators were thrilled by 
the specifically European dimension of their mandates (evolving in an international 
environment, working on the big projects of the future), it is rather the added-value this 
mandate has from the French « market » perspective which pleases these MEPs. Interviewee 
n°2 summarizes it perfectly when he conveys that: 
 
« The truth is that it is a beautiful mandate. We are not a lot; we are only 20 for the UMP. 
This means that we are not numerous to express a French voice in a France who has lost 
influence at the European level and who is losing it even more with the policies of Mr 
Hollande. » 
 
Respondent n°6 adds in the same perspective: 
 
« Well it’s…it’s a great honour…I mean we are really not that much. In a lifetime….when you 
do politics to have a mandate like this one is once again an honour. We modestly try to live up 
to it but yes I am very proud of it. » 
 
Moreover, and once again in complete opposition to European animators, French Politicians 
do not draw satisfaction from the typically European dimension of the mandate but rather 
from the consequence it has for their political life. To a large extent, the French Politician is a 
« political animal » who lives for and from politics. When asked what they would miss the 
most if they left politics, both interviewees mentioned the thrill and the excitement they have 
being politicians and fighting for their ideas. Respondent n°2 says the following about why he 
decided to come back in the political life even though he was financially independent because 
of a long stand professional activity on the side of his political career: 
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« The only thing I missed, and it is the reason why I came back, is the fight! The political 
fight, it’s like a high-level sportsman! We want to have political fights, to confront ideas, to 
exchange opinions, to try to affirm ourselves, to defend our positions, to move our pawns in 
order that our ideas go forward. So that is the only thing that I missed because…so I have a 
professional activity, I have remunerations so…it’s simply the conquest of power and the 
exchange of ideas. » 
 
In the same vein, Interviewee n°6 does not imagine leaving anytime soon the public sphere 
and if it had to happen he hopes it would be the consequence of a personal decision rather 
than following a defeat. Politics is part of him and he does not know how he could find a job 
after that. As he elegantly mentions it, it would be hard for him to find another activity 
because politics is like « a big tattoo in the back! ». French Politicians typically do not 
exercise any important responsibilities within the European Parliament because they are 
newcomers to this institution and because they already exercise (professional and political) 
responsibilities outside the chamber. For instance, interviewee n°2 regularly stresses that to 
the opposite of other parliamentarians he has a job on the outside which enables him to take 
decisions very independently. Respondent n°6 cumulates numerous local mandates: he is the 
mayor of a city of 20 000 inhabitants, chair of a Community of Councils, President of an 
association of mayors. The local « roots » of the French Politician has direct consequences for 
the frustration he can have concerning the EP and for his ambitions within the institution.  
 
French Politicians are freshmen MEPs and therefore they express frustration concerning the 
complexity of an institution which they are still discovering. The slow mechanisms behind 
each decision-making, the complexity of the functioning of Europe, the difficulty to obtain 
efficient changes are reluctant motives of their frustration. Moreover, they link this frustration 
directly to their (potential) electorate. Respondent n°2 analyses his frustration in the following 
way: 
 
« But when we take a decision at the European level to find subsidies for farmers who got 
fucked in the frame of their establishment; that there are several hundred millions or a billion 
that needs to be validated… The stake is that the farmer actually manages to get a hand on 
this money. But before he actually manages, hello! It’s of a rare complexity to actually 
manage to. And therefore there is no way that he will reach it. It does not frustrate me, but it 
is going to irritate me very quick! »  
 
In their opinion, it is this complexity which is directly responsible for the rejection of an 
important part of the French population of the European Union and which enables extreme-
right and populist political parties to gain more and more seats in the EP. The second 
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consequence of this accumulation of activities is linked to their ambitions within the 
institution. To their own acknowledgment, being newcomers makes it harder for them to 
know where the real zones of influence are and how to concretely proceed in order to gain 
new positions. Respondent n°2 summarizes it perfectly: 
 
« In one year I took what I wanted…I took what I wanted so I am satisfied. I will be able to 
answer better this question, because I am a young European parliamentarian, when I will 
have perfectly understood the zones of influence around here. There. So now for my first 
mandate I obtained what I wished and so…hum…I believe that I will be able to answer better 
this question in a year or two. » 
 
Interviewee n°6 has an even more humble approach, considering that climbing up the ladder 
should be done step by step: 
 
« No, right now, no. Now it’s to do correctly the job but hum… (No half-mandate 
objectives?). No no. It’s to do correctly the job, obtain a report, and have topics on which I 
am recognised in my committee. But nothing more than that for now. (Are there any topics 
which interest you in particular?). Well those on which I am working right now (...) on 
copyright, the issue that it can represent in substance and because it’s also about defending 
the interests of France. » 
 
Whereas for European animators career ambitions are intrinsically linked to the EP and to 
holding positions within the institution, French Politicians MEPs do not reflect in the same 
way to the issue. To the question « Where do you see yourself in 5/10 years », these MEPs 
unambiguously answer that their career paths and ambitions are the product of opportunities. 
In this sense, French Politicians do not consider themselves bound to the European Parliament 
or to any institutions for the matter. The fact that they have already exercised many 
responsibilities by the past and some still ongoing seems to confirm this hypothesis. This is 
why French Politicians paradoxically have the hardest ambitions to read: one could expect, by 
the view of their « political biographies » and by taking into consideration their local and 
French « roots » that their career ambitions lie in their national territory or in some other place 
than the EP. However, their answers and ambitions diverge from these traditional views. 
Respondent n°6 answers simply: 
 
« Listen, today I am 47 years old, in five years it will be the end of the mandate. Well I hope 
to do another one. And hum…ten years from now I do not know. (You do not know?) No. No. 
(It’s maybe a bit too far ahead?). Well you know things are…once again two years ago I 
would have never imagined I would become one day an MEP. So hum…when I started…when 
I finished my studies I would never have imagined doing politics. So …life is made of 
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opportunities, special occasions, encounters, and so…to tell you 5 years is already a lot, but 
10 years is impossible to conceive. »  
 
In the same vein, interviewee n°2 refuses during the interview to project himself politically: 
 
« Pfffff… No idea. No idea. I will do everything to be happy. It is not an individual quest, it 
will anyways be a collective quest, that is I always worked for….I am a doctor…I always 
worked for the general interest, I always was the students’ representative, or of my 
profession…I always committed myself to a common good so maybe I will be working for a 
charity or in an association, maybe that…hum….I will be writing books or poetry 
hum…anyways I think that you need an intellectual elevation and I believe that you need to 
give back what was given to you. » 
  
While respondent n°2 does not per se exclude a European career, he does not attach any 
particular significance to his mandate either. Far from that, he is actually the one who keeps 
coming back during the interview on his past experiences as a Minister, as an MP and as a 
local politician, by emphasizing how much pleasure he took exercising each of these 
functions. In this sense, the European Parliament does not represent for the French Politician 
the endpoint of a career or the achievement of a longstanding goal which would make sense in 
his personal trajectory, but should rather be seen as one among the many fruitful experiences 
of his political career. 
 
c) The Local Specialist 
 
The third category that the conducted interviews allow us to depict is the one of the « Local 
Specialist ». These MEPs characterise themselves by the strong attachment they demonstrate 
to their local territory as well by their specialisation in one particular topic of the legislative 
work. They constitute the most « ambiguous » role model because of the diversity of 
representative style and political biographies they constitute. This specific group is composed 
of freshmen and incumbent MEPs, of men and women, and of all different range of ages. 
They share heteroclite ambitions even though to a large extent they can be categorised under 
the banner of « discrete » ambitious: this will be the last mandate of three of the four 
respondents of this group. Nonetheless, Local Specialists share key characteristics when it 
comes to their personal conception of the European mandate, their motivation, their 
satisfaction and frustration and this makes this group an important category of our sample and 
apart from the two other ideal-types that are the European animator and the French Politician. 
Respondent n°4, n°5, n°7 and to a lesser extent n°8 are the interviewees who correspond the 
most with this category. 
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Whereas European animators showed extreme motivations to become MEPs (putting an end 
to a national mandate or fighting hard within the party) and French Politicians close to none 
(being asked by their home-party or important members of the party to stand for election), the 
Local Specialist constitutes somehow a category in between. To their own acknowledgment, 
none of the interviewees had ever imagined becoming one day a Member of the European 
Parliament. Using the same rhetoric that of French Politicians, they present their candidacy 
and then their elections as opportunities. While French Politicians were directly asked by the 
home-party to stand for election because of their high profile (former Minister and MPs), 
Local Specialists were asked to become candidate not per se by the party but by a specific 
member of the party. In other words, each Local Specialist was godfathered by a special 
figure, and preferably a European figure. Respondent n°5 recognizes that: 
 
« Actually, (M.B) is the one who always considered that…well, when I mean who always 
considered…since 1994, (M.B) has always been militantly in favour that I become a 
candidate to the European elections. Because of agricultural issues and because I was 
recognized on these topics. He fought hard so that I could be on the lists in 1994. »  
 
In the same vein, respondent n°4 argues that she never had any career plans based on the 
European Parliament but because she « fitted » the expected profile (a woman politically 
involved with European issues) and because she was pushed by her former employer, a high-
profile MEP, she accepted the position on the list: 
 
« I mean concerning the mandate in itself: it was really an opportunity; I never had any 
career plans based on that: I had imagined doing many other things, at the regional level 
actually, in Alsace. At no moment I actually saw myself becoming an MEP and then there, it 
was the circumstances: a woman was needed, (from the region, on the list), politically 
committed which was my case as I was engaged and had responsibilities with the Bas-Rhin’s 
UMP, and who appreciated European issues, which was also my case. In any case, I had no 
career plans to become a Member of the European Parliament. » 
 
Whereas respondent n°4 and n°5 demonstrated specific « valuable » skills for the European 
market (respondent n°5 was very involved with agricultural issues and respondent n°4 was the 
former parliamentary assistant of an MEP and she was committed regionally to economic 
issues), respondent n°7 admits that he had never really « heard » of Europe before starting his 
mandate. Like the other interviewees, he was asked by his « politicians colleagues » to run for 
a seat in the EP: 
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« It was for me something that…that was not foreseeable, that was not reflected upon. We 
proposed to me politically, the politicians colleagues proposed to me, to be true. I was 
member of the government for 10 years: I could have started a third mandate but the 
colleagues did not propose to me to do something else because there was this possibility to 
become a Member of the European Parliament. And so I told myself: « Why not? » and so I 
went for it, and there you go! » 
 
As shortly mentioned beforehand, Local Specialists have the lowest political profile of the 
French delegation to the European People’s Party. None of them ever exercised before their 
European mandate important or national responsibilities within governments or parliaments, 
and their election to the EP was more the fruit of opportunities and circumstances than of their 
own will : this has naturally important repercussions on the perceptions they have of their 
roles as European parliamentarians and for their ambitions. 
 
First of all, concerning their duties and responsibilities as MEPs, Local Specialists have a very 
specific vision of the parliamentary work. Whereas European animators and French 
Politicians consider that the main responsibility of a good MEP is to exercise influence 
(through specific legislative work or by choosing strategic activities), the Local Specialist 
distinguishes himself from the other ideal-types by the special link he tries to create with his 
local territory and constituency. Respondent n°7 describes his duties in the following manner: 
 
« Me, I come personally from (a region) so hum…I try to ensure that (my region) can benefit 
from my mandate of MEP. And I try to see, here, with my team: we are trying to see with my 
team which instruments, which financial instrument can (my region) benefit from, for those 
who still do not. And that is precisely the work we did during the last legislature. » 
 
In this sense, a good MEP for a Local Specialist is an MEP who is capable of creating good 
legislation which will in the end benefit to a particular sector or population. The possessions 
of two necessary qualities to achieve these goals are remotely quoted by Local Specialists: a 
good capacity of listening and hard-work. This last quality is not so much essential for 
legislating than to be recognised by their peers: as Local Specialists argue, if other members 
do not see that you are very implied within the chamber’s work, it will be difficult to progress 
and achieve your goals. As explains interviewee n°5: 
 
« Here, if you want to be legitimate, you need to work. Hum…I was a member of the 
Committee on Agriculture….So I did everything in the Committee on Agriculture as a full-
time member, I spent five years in the Committee on Transports as a substitute and today I am 
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in the Committee on Environment. In the three committees, it’s the same thing. You have those 
who are present, those who are respected because they know their subjects and they are 
constant in their ideas, and those who are insignificant entities. And the…the true difference 
from one MEP to another is in my opinion the quality of the work they produce. And the 
recognition of this work by the peers. » 
 
Local Specialists are less politically endowed than their other (French) peers and for this 
reason it is important for them to legitimize their actions by working hard and specializing 
themselves in one topic. This also explains why two out the four MEPs who constitute this 
ideal-type exercise specific responsibilities within committees: one of them is Vice-President 
of a Committee and the other one Vice-coordinator for the EPP Group. This demonstrates a 
strong investment in a specific and relevant sector for both of them. It is also because they are 
specialists in a certain domain and coming from a specific territory within their 
"euroconstituency" that they were initially enrolled by the party. Therefore, their investment 
in the parliamentary work acts as a translation of these two conditions by demonstrating on 
the one hand that they « earned » their place on the list, and on the other hand that they are 
« legitimate » as MEPs : each Local Specialist is member of a Committee which makes 
« sense » in light of their previous professional commitments. Whereas they cannot really be 
considered as former members of civil society, their presence on the list is principally due to a 
speciality, a savoir-faire which is recognised for having a political added-value. As a 
consequence, Local Specialists are invested in committees relevant to their own experience : 
interviewee n°5 is full-time member of the Committee on Agriculture after having worked for 
years with these issues professionally at first then through his local mandate ; interviewee n°7 
is a full-time member of the Committee on Development, as he comes from a region where 
the European Development Fund is primordial for the well-being of the population ; 
interviewee n°4 is a full-time member of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs 
and a substitute in the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy which makes sense if we 
consider that she worked for years in her region’s Economic, Social and Environmental 
Council. 
 
These key characteristics have consequences for the representative role of this category of 
MEPs. Even though one could expect that Local Specialists when asked « As an MEP, who 
do you represent? » would answer « My constituency », the answer is in fact more subtle. 
First, two of the four MEPs who compose this ideal-type unambiguously consider that they 
represent the whole of the European Union. As interviewee n°8 argues: 
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« First of all, I would like to remind what appears in the French Constitution and in the 
Treaties of the Union that established the European Parliament, which is that there is no 
binding mandate! Which everyone forgets all of the time! Those who tell you: « I propose 110 
proposals or 60 commitments » (if this reminds you recent elections), they can betray them 
without any fear because there is no binding mandate. Me, I personally do not make any 
promises, it makes me feel more at ease… » 
 
The vagueness of interpretation of the mandate and of the Treaties allows these MEPs to take 
more liberty when it comes to understand their own roles. Another crucial factor is that these 
two MEPs are « discretely » ambitious, which means that this mandate is probably their last. 
To the acknowledgment of respondent n°8, it presents the advantage of being freer when they 
have to take decisions. However, and bearing in mind these two exceptions, Local Specialists 
show a tendency of representing their constituency, and even sometimes a specific sector of 
their territory. Whereas European animators acted clearly on the behalf of the citizens of the 
EU and of their (general) constituency, and French Politicians on the behalf of France and 
certain values (the French right-wing for instance), Local Specialists are the voices of specific 
sectors of the constituency. For example, interviewee n°4 confesses: 
 
« I represent the citizens of my constituency, so: my constituency it’s the East of France, so 
five administrative regions in the East. So I represent the individual citizens but my idea is 
also to represent professional organizations, the organized civil society who defends private 
interests at the same time. » 
 
A bit later in the interview, she admits that she is for example much more sensible to the 
demands of her fellow centre-right wing constituents than of those from extreme-left.  
Respondent n°5 claims that he is well-known from certain industries and that the mandate of 
European parliamentarian in itself does not allow a larger recognition from the population: 
 
« The difficulty is to ... the difficulty is to make the work we do recognize on the field. In 
general, we are pretty well recognized by the sector for which we work for. Hum…the 
chemistry industry, the hunters, agriculture, transports…But to have a larger legitimacy in 
the public opinion is another story… » 
 
Whereas European animators consider being an MEP and working within the European 
institutions to be important because as representatives they have an impact on the projects of 
the future, and French politicians consider their duty is to be pedagogical about Europe 
because it is important for France, Local Specialists anchor the importance of their mandate in 
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an exclusively local perspective. In one word, the EU is important for these MEPs because 
their constituency and local territory can benefit a lot from it. Interviewee n°7 considers that 
he was elected so that his constituency can benefit from his mandate: 
 
« You need to be present in order to answer their interests. And so hum…that was during the 
last legislature and now it continues. It continues for the (the constituency), which means 
that…You know that they benefit from the European Development Fund (EDF) like African 
countries. But they are not developing countries like African countries for example. They are 
already at a higher level but…they still use the EDF. So we are trying with my team…we are 
going to try to propose another instrument, much more flexible, registered in the budget of the 
European Union, which would allow to use this new instrument much more easily than the 
EDF. » 
 
These politicians’ ambitions are not innocent from their particular conception of their role. 
Indeed, interviewee n°4 confessed that she had never imagined becoming an MEP one day 
and that she had always prepared herself for a regional career. On the same line, interviewee 
n°5 claimed at the beginning of the interview that he will be in the obligation of letting down 
his European mandate after this legislature because he was meanwhile elected Mayor of a city 
of 60 000 inhabitants and with the law forbidding the « cumul des mandats » which will enter 
in application by 2019, he cannot do both together. Interviewee n°7 considers himself too old 
and too tired to continue a new mandate and Interviewee's n°8 future is to his own 
acknowledgment and for several reasons extremely uncertain. From these perspectives, their 
career ambitions and plans act as good explanatory factors of their roles.  
 
The satisfaction and frustration that Local Specialists draw from their mandate is also typical 
of their category. Whereas European animators enjoyed the specifically European dimension 
of their position, and French Politician the sparseness of their mandate in comparison to the 
French market, Local Specialists take pleasure in the work-load of the function which enables 
them to specialize themselves in one topic and which they unanimously consider as an 
enriching experience. In this sense, they appreciate what the mandate can or would bring to 
them outside of the walls of the European Parliament. During the interviews, the respondents 
regularly referred to how « fascinating » their mandate is and how much they learn from it. 
Interviewee n°4 describes her mandate as follows: 
 
« It’s a beautiful experience. Yes yes yes. It’s fascinating. It’s very absorbing but it’s really 
fascinating. (What do you like in the mandate?). Well, I like the diversity. It’s very diverse. 
So in the beginning, it’s difficult because we switch from one world to another regularly: so 
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we switch from one topic to another, very technical subjects, very specific. So me for example 
I am in the Employment Committee, in the Industry Committee, I follow a bit agricultural 
issues, and we switch from one topic to another and every time you have to get back in the 
saddle…so there you go… Also, you switch from one place to another, between your 
territories, the Parliament in Strasbourg, the Parliament in Brussels, so it varies a lot, it’s 
very rich, and I like a lot the contact with people. » 
 
Interviewee n°7 specifically emphasizes the pleasure he takes from working on certain files: 
 
« I take pleasure from what I do because we are doing things for the (whole constituency). 
We stood up in some cases for the (whole constituency) and so there you go. I mean 
hum…It’s a very very interesting mandate. Very very interesting. It’s well…very good…we 
are always here following the cases and so it makes you work. And then we are satisfied when 
a text passes, and with satisfaction comes the desire to work. Yes yes. »  
 
In the same vein, respondent n°5 was at first chocked by the question concerning his 
satisfaction of being an MEP because he considered it to be pretentious. However, and 
making the same comparisons than previously did by European animators, he underlines that 
the huge advantage of being an European deputy is that you can work in peace and not under 
the constraints of medias. In his opinion, MEPs are first and foremost judged on their results 
and legislative efficiency, which seems only fair. Precisely like interviewee n°2 whose role 
comes closest to a French Politician, he argues that pleasure is not the motor of his career or 
ambitions: he confesses that the question of satisfaction is one he never addresses. In this 
sense, Local Specialists fit well the « discrete ambitious » politicians as they are described by 
Gaddie (2004): it is rather more the sense of duty and the satisfaction of good-work which 
animates them than the pleasure of climbing the ladders of political hierarchy. 
 
Based on what we said, it should not come as a surprise that Local Specialists are the less 
frustrated group of our sample by any means. When respondents actually express frustration 
or dissatisfaction is it rather heteroclite or in their own words « meaningless »: their 
frustrations are not too much of an important topic to focus on, they argue. Whether it is the 
work-organisation of the chamber for interviewee n°4, the difficulty of establishing a more 
solid link with the constituency for interviewee n°5 or the lack of acknowledgment of their 
work from the medias for interviewee n°8, the mentioned frustrations are not per se essential 
elements of this ideal-type. Whereas European animators are very frustrated by the « system » 
in general and French Politicians by its « complexity », Local Specialists do not situate 
themselves within this logic. Interviewee n°7 imagines a situation where he could be 
frustrated as the following: 
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« I come from far away all things considered. (...). Frustrated, if I was always complaining 
about wanting to fly back home all of the time etc…this would be a frustration. But I have 
found pleasure in working here and so… I compensate this frustration with the pleasure I take 
in working. That is all. » 
 
 
He argues further that spending time in the work-load is the best way to beat frustration and 
once he retires he is scared to become bored.  
 
In many aspects, Local Specialists MEPs are the politicians of our sample with the less 
power-play. As described before, they have the lowest political profile and their election is the 
fruit of circumstances and « godfathers » rather than the product of their own will. These 
politicians are typically « discretely » ambitious, in the sense that this mandate will be very 
probably their last before going home to retire or pursue other responsibilities. It is for 
example striking that respondent n°5 confesses that if he had followed his own career plans he 
would have taken bigger responsibilities within the EP and would not have pursued a local 
career : 
 
« Because I wanted to do a second mandate, in order to finish the CAP and to (because it’s a 
second mandate we can take more responsibilities)…in fact we came to me to ask me to take 
the presidency of the Committee on Agriculture (Yes?). Hum…Joseph Daul offered it to me, 
the former Commissioner M. Boel offered it to me, Di Castro the outgoing President told me : 
« (...), you are the one who should take my place » etc…I did not accept to take the chair of 
the Committee on Agriculture because it is not compatible with the mandate of mayor of (my 
commune). I am under the obligation to really limit my time here or in Brussels: I spend the 
time that is necessary to my mandate, which means participating to the sessions, participating 
to the group meetings, to the groups etc…But I cannot spill over: a mayor position is very 
absorbing… so there. (Yes). But, if you want, if I had leaded my personal plan I would not be 
the mayor of (my commune) and I would have taken responsibilities in the European 
Parliament. » 
 
 
In the same vein, interviewee n°4 refuses to project herself in the future because it is too 
uncertain: she rather prefers talking of « wishes » to designate her own career plans. 
Interviewee n°7 answered automatically that he will be going home after his mandate and 
interviewee n°8 is preparing himself to find a new job soon.  
 
Therefore, in term of career plans, representative style and conception of the European 
mandate, the Local Specialist is a pretty unique and meaningful ideal-type to understand the 
different roles which exist in the 2014 French delegation to the EPP. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the previous research, the theoretical framework and the analysis section of this 
Master’s Thesis, we should be able to proceed in answering the research question of this 
paper, which was « How do career ambitions shape the roles MEPs adopt in the chamber? ». 
As one could expect, the answer to this question is far from being one-folded. In a nutshell, 
« Yes » ambitions influence the roles of MEPs in many aspects but « not » in the ways the 
literature usually describes it, at least based on the empirical evidence of the eight conducted 
interviews with members of the French delegation to the European People’s Party in the 
2014-2019 legislature. 
 
This explorative study proceeded quite successfully in establishing typologies and ideal-types 
of MEPs based on their roles and ambitions. Whereas most previous studies had created in 
isolation ideal-types of ambitions (Schlesinger 1966, Herrick 1993) or career paths as they are 
called in European studies (Hix 2002, Scarrow 1997, Meserve et al. 2009) and roles (Searing 
1994, Navarro 2007, Costa 2009, Scully and Farrell 2003), no paper had before, to my 
knowledge, tried to link these « variables » or set of factors together in order to explain the 
behaviours of parliamentarians. In this sense, this first brush of results is satisfying. 
 
Another reason for satisfaction is that it is possible to study actual empirical material on the 
sole basis of interviews, as it was first sensed by Searing and later exposed by Herrick, in 
order to interrogate politicians’ career plans. The benefits of this method to the opposite of 
more quantitative-vote-based strategies for gathering data, is that there is no way of getting 
around the intentions of politicians concerning their ambitions. While a posteriori and 
biographical studies can only speculate on the true-intentions of MEPs, by basing their 
analysis on MEPs voting behaviours during particular legislatures or their movements from 
one career arena to another (local, regional, national, supranational), interviews have the 
benefit of putting the question on the table, either directly « Where do you see yourself in 5/10 
years ? », « Are there any other positions you wish to pursue in the chamber ? » or by indirect 
means « Will you be candidate to other elections by the end of your mandate ? », « Would you 
be ready to put an end to your European mandate for some other position ? » in order to code 
ambitions.  
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The same thing can be said about the roles of politicians : whereas studies strictly based on 
quantitative data and statistics, which for example base their explanations on the measurement 
of the rate of participation of MEPs in plenary session, the amount of tabled amendments or 
the number of time certain MEPs speak during group meetings, can only guess the 
satisfaction these politicians draw from these type of activities or the sense of duties and 
responsibilities they administer to their roles, interviews have the benefit to ask MEPs directly 
what it is they like about their mandate. Questions such « What satisfies you the most in your 
mandate? », « What frustrates you about being an MEP? », « In your opinion, what 
distinguishes a good from a bad MEP? » offer moreover the guarantee to obtain answers 
which will make sense for the construction of ideal-types. From that point of view, the 
answers to these questions by all of the respondents provide a real contribution to the 
literature on politicians and parliamentarians behaviours. 
 
However, the study presented an important amount of difficulties that were only partly 
overcome during the phase of qualitative data gathering and which, as a consequence, 
strongly influences the final answer to our initial research question. Among these difficulties, 
inherent to a paper based solely on interviews, was to obtain actual answers to the questions 
asked: these were double-folded. First, how can we truly trust the worthiness of politicians’ 
answers? Second, how can we code efficiently ambitions in their answers? 
 
Whereas American ambition theorists argue, in a nutshell, that most politicians are rational 
and progressively ambitious in the sense that their intentions are to climb up the political 
ladder, the empirical evidence seems to nuance this statement. A good way of analysing 
ambitions was to ask MEPs if they would be ready to put an end to their mandate for national 
responsibilities. The question was asked in such a way that it was opened to interpretation: in 
France, national responsibilities can mean many different things, from a position of Minister 
to a seat in the National Assembly or the French Senate. These functions are not compatible 
with a seat in the European Parliament. The answers to this question actually shed light on 
practices that mainstream ambition theory hardly covers: in France, politicians do not run for 
national responsibilities, they are called to them. Politicians are either called by the 
government to become a Minister or by the party to run in its name in a constituency in order 
to integrate the national Parliament. This has consequence for French politicians and MEPs 
ambitions in and outside the EP: to the opposite of American politicians, there is rarely any 
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individual conquest of power in French politicians’ mind. Interviewee n°3 summarizes the 
strategies of candidacy which are specific to French parties in the following way: 
 
« But when you say national responsibilities, what do you mean? Deputy, senator or 
Minister? There are only three national functions. Well there is also President of the Republic 
but that would maybe be going a bit far ahead! This, I rarely think about to the honest…I 
actually do not think about it all…But as there is an incompatibility, if one day, yes, 
something happened in the sense of acquiring a national mandate, I would de facto put an 
end to my functions of Member of the European Parliament. But it would have been the result 
of a strategy that would have been constructed, developed, in the cyclist sense of the term, for 
a very long time etc etc. I am not at this point today. (You do not think about it?). I do not 
think about pissing off the entire world and every cacique of my party to obtain at all costs an 
investiture for something. But I simply know, because I am a little bit experienced after 
hanging all of these years in this environment, I know that things often happen that we, 
ourselves, had not prepared or anticipated because there are collective political strategies, 
there are strategies which are constructed by the political family and sometimes it is suitable 
to fold for them. There. That is all. I …I do not say anything mysterious. »  
 
MEPs evolve in a constraining environment and their power-play at all means in quite limited 
because European elections are hardly held on the name of politicians. They have to cope 
with many factors to satisfy their ambitions: the party, their constituents, the (new) institution 
in which they participate, their peers. This means that if there are strategies of ambitions, they 
are rarely the result of individual will. Several examples in our analysis section showed that 
MEPs are not acting alone when it comes to choose the mandate they want to run for or the 
one they wish to run from. That is the same thing for progressive ambition. Whereas 
American neo-institutionalists present ambition as a sometimes long-established individual 
strategic mean of obtaining a seat with more prestige than the one actually occupied by a 
politician, several interviewees argued against this traditional view. Interviewee n°2 explains 
why he would have to accept a position of Minister if he was nominated to: 
 
« I do not have the choice! (You do not have the choice?). When you are called to the 
government, you cannot say no. If you are here to serve! Me, I already did it 
twice…Hum…will I be called again? No idea. Maybe it’s time for the younger generation. If 
we call me I do not have the choice, we never say no to the government, it is my duty. » 
 
Respondent n°2 does not argue that he would want this position, but he states instead that he 
would not have the choice. Does this count as ambition then? If an MEP ends up in a higher 
position than the one he could/would or should have wished for, it certainly means that this 
politician had a risen trajectory but it does not mean per se that he was ambitious for it. Many 
politicians accepted certain position or to be candidates to certain elections because they 
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considered it to be their duty. This argument overflows the classical viewpoint that some 
MEPs use intentionally the EP as a stepping-stone for a national career. To her own 
acknowledgment, interviewee n°3 describes herself as a « good soldier » of the party. 
Respondent n°2 makes this interesting comment about being a Minister a bit later in the 
interview: 
 
« Let me reformulate the question in relation to your feelings. It is very very important for a 
politician to enter the government. And for a politician, there is no successful career if he 
does not enter the government. Me, I was twice a member of the government. I am very happy 
to have been part of it and probably at the most beautiful place at the best of times. There. 
Now there are people who dream to go back there and others who dream to enter for the first 
time a government, and who would do anything for it. Me, I had it and I was very happy. I 
will not prostitute myself to do it again. I am completely detached from that. » 
 
Similarly, it is striking to see how interviewee n°1, the most European ambitious respondent 
of the sample, reacts about entering in the government: 
 
« Well yes of course! To come back to the government, yes of course (Yes?) Well yes, for sure. 
Well, in a domain which would be linked to things I know. But this question is not of actuality 
in the years to come… » 
 
On the other hand, many respondents did not alone consider this opportunity as a possibility. 
Perhaps the fact that some MEPs did not evoke the sole possibility of entering the 
government, and others of becoming national MPs, are revelatory of the reachability of these 
goals, or as interviewee n°2 ironically describes his colleagues, their « Peter’s scale ». Others, 
like respondent n°8, brutally beat back this type of position: 
 
« No no no. It does not interest…what is it? Is it to become a Minister? That does not interest 
me! Absolutely no interest. The complete emptiness of this type of post rouses absolutely no 
enthusiasm, no interest in me. (…). Which can seem strange for someone who has worked 
close with power but…I do not have the pretentiousness to leave a trace in history! It does not 
work like that… » 
 
In the same vein, intrainstitutional ambition, as it is understood the ambition to gain a more 
prestigious seat within the institution, is also the product of complex mechanisms proper to 
the European Parliament. Whereas American political science « calculates » how rational it 
would be for a parliamentarian to invest in campaigning for higher seats, the inner logic of the 
institution does not quite fit this model : as demonstrated before, the EP functions on the basis 
of diverse mechanisms which are there to ensure the largest representation of nationalities and 
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parties within its walls. When they were asked for which position they would like to run in the 
EP, many MEPs argued that things are not as simple as that: the logic of rotation and of 
diversified representation (called la loi d’Hondt) distribute leadership positions and 
"rapporteurship" in the institution. This does not mean that MEPs cannot develop self-
conscious strategies to obtain more prestigious seats, but that these seats are rather the product 
of often uncontrolled circumstances, such as the result of their party at the European elections, 
the size of their national delegation, the nationality of the individual who let a seat vacant, the 
intentions of other participants, the distribution of reports in the chamber. Interviewee n°3 
stresses how complicated this type of positions are to obtain: 
 
« Oh no! In a near future, no no no no. No no. Anyway, there are no new functions coming at 
the horizon. The function of President of Group is occupied for the moment quite seriously I 
think so. No, there are no other functions for which I aspire. (No Presidency of Committee 
for example?). Oh no no no no, these are things are so complicated to implement, hum…No 
no I do not ambition this at all, I do not express the wish to develop any strategies in this 
regard. No, not at all. No no. » 
 
On the other hand, respondent n°1 obtained the Chair of Special Committee shortly after the 
interview was conducted. Even though he was asked during the interview which other 
position he would like to pursue in the EP, he never mentioned anything in relation with 
chairing a committee (but he did though mention his intention to be the next President of the 
EP): can we count this event as the demonstration of his ambition for new seats? The 
interviews do not unfortunately let us think so. Moreover, when does ambition start and when 
does it stop? Several MEPs have argued during the interviews that if they could, they would 
run again for a seat, but circumstances (the cumul des mandats, retirement age) prevent them 
from. Interviewee n°5 explained very clearly that if he had the choice he would be 
campaigning five years from now for a new seat in Brussels. He wishes to, but he cannot 
clearly ambition it. The same thing can be said about interviewee n°7 : he feels that he is 
getting old and tired, and he would crave to go home which is « far-away » after his mandate, 
but he likes the EP and he hesitates to go for another mandate : what are his real ambitions 
then ?  
 
The concept of ambition as it is currently developed in the literature is problematic to give a 
full account of the different strategies developed by MEPs for their desired futures. Based on 
the answers of the eight respondents, their different ambitions would look like the following 
in a table: 
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Table 4. Typology of the ambitions of the eight respondents interviewed based on the 
American "ambition theory" literature 
 
Discrete 
ambition 
Static ambition Intrainstitutional 
ambition 
Progressive 
ambition 
Interviewee n°1 Interviewee n°3 
(clearly evoked) 
Interviewee n°1 
(became member of 
the bureau of  a 
Special Committee 
since the end of the 
interview/ 
Presidency of the 
EP) (*2) 
Interviewee n°2 
(Presidency of a 
regional council 
/Important position 
in the party/ 
Becoming a 
Minister)  
Interviewee n°7 Interviewee n°6 
(clearly evoked) 
Interviewee n°4 
(obtaining a report) 
(*2) 
 
Interviewee n°5 
(of being an 
MEP) 
Interviewee n°4 Interviewee n°6 
(obtaining a report) 
(*2) 
 
Interviewee n°8 Interviewee n°7 
(*2) 
  
 Interviewee n°5 
(*2) 
  
 
As we can see, there are no straight-forward and unique ambition by MEPs. If we actually 
used only straight-forward answers (which are underlined), we would only have been able to 
situate two MEPs on the ladder of their career plans. In fact, MEPS can have multiple and 
non-exclusive ambitions (in bold) which sometimes are not solely based on career motivations 
(obtaining a report for example constitutes an ambition for certain MEPs). Therefore, these 
categories made little sense to cover MEPs ambitions and to explain their roles, which this 
thesis proposed to do in a first place. When comparing MEPs ambitions with their roles (the 
answers they gave to their different type of motivations, duties, representative style, 
satisfaction and frustration), we managed to create three ideal-types of ambitious MEPs in the 
2014 French delegation to the European People’s Party. These categories have the advantage 
of using ambition as a leitmotiv for their roles. Whereas previous research did not take into 
consideration ambition as a primordial factor to explain parliamentary behaviours (outside 
from voting behaviours), this thesis took the bet that it is possible to establish a typology of 
ambition which corresponds to a typology of roles of MEPs: the overarching aim was to 
demonstrate that these type of motivations should be taken more seriously by researchers 
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interested in the attitudes of parliamentarians. In these regards, and as expressed in the 
discussion section and in our analysis, this Master’s thesis is a semi-success. It succeeds in 
creating typologies which makes sense for the actors themselves, as the abductive method 
prescribes to, and in obtaining answers which are relevant for the French delegation as a 
whole and probably for other parliamentarians. However, several points will need 
confirmation and an improvement in future studies, notably what constituted the essence of 
the thesis: the solid link between ambition and roles. Whereas the ideal-types demonstrate 
without any ambiguity that there is a relationship between how parliamentarians conceive 
their desire futures and how they understand their European mandate, and that this 
relationship differs in at least three different manners for our sample, the study nonetheless is 
limited in two ways: first, the interviews do not allow us completely to testify that it is in 
reality career ambitions which shape the roles of MEPs. At no point in the interviews did any 
MEPs confess that they act in a certain ways because it would be better for their career plans. 
This is after all not very surprising: such acts are generally seen as cynical and we should not 
expect anybody, politicians above all, to plead in their favour or to confess of doing them. 
Moreover, emotionalist interviews do not favour ostensibly the confession of acts based on 
pure rationalism (which previous research usually conveys for), but require from respondents 
to mobilise argument tools based foremost on emotions and pleasure. In this regards, it is 
nonetheless satisfying to observe that there is a link between pleasure and rationalism, 
emotions and career goals, and that MEPs are after all "human beings". Moreover, as we 
demonstrated before, ambitions are not only the product of individual desires but also of 
circumstances and, in this regards, they can be irrational. The second limit of the thesis is to 
mobilize sufficiently satisfying answers from MEPs concerning their ambitions, and which 
was after all the angular stone of this study: without the politicians' revealing their goals, the 
thesis would have lost all of its interest. Even though every MEPs answered questions 
concerning their ambitions, their desired futures, position they would like to seek, there is 
however absolutely no way to know the truth about their intentions. They could easily have 
lied either because they do not see the benefit of revealing their objectives to an unknown 
student or either, as many of the respondents have argued, because they simply do not know. 
Should we for instance believe Respondent n°2 when he said that he could very well be 
writing poetry five years from now? There is a thin line between not knowing where one will 
go and between where one wishes to go: this is for example what respondent n°5 pleaded 
when the question was asked to her. She summarizes perfectly the difficulty to situate oneself 
in the future for an MEP: 
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« I am incapable to answer this question. Incapable to answer you. I cannot tell you. I do not 
see. I do not see. (Do you not know?) No no. If I was a national member of Parliament with 
my constituency, with a personal and unique candidacy ; if I liked what I do I would tell you 
« There, I will be re-elected and I will get involved in the territory ». But here, you know, the 
composition of lists, the constitution of list is so…how to say …I do not want to say 
complicated but today I am not capable to tell you that I will be once again in an eligible 
position on the list. Many French MEPs have spent five years in the European Parliament 
and did not come back after that. So today ideally I would tell you « I would be delighted to 
be here again, to make several mandates » because, first of all, it would interest me, it 
fascinates me but also because I believe that it would be a good thing for France to have this 
stability at the level of elected representatives, but I am not able to tell you…It would be a 
wish, there you go! Yes, it is a wish, it is a wish. » 
 
 
Therefore, to what extent is interviewee n°5 ambitious to become again an MEP? She clearly 
expresses the wish to become one again, but at the same time she seems completely defeated 
by the complex process of a re-selection by her home-party. On the other hand, interviewee 
n°3 and n°6 clearly said that they would like to become MEPs again, without eluding too 
much on the modalities of how this would happen: are their answers the same than the one of 
interviewee n°5? Are they ambitious in the same way? Classical political science tools answer 
this question with difficulty because they rarely give subtle nuances to politicians’ desires. 
This is why an approach based on role theory was developed all along the thesis to give a 
context to ambition: whereas ambitions were primarily used to reveal different practices of 
the European mandate, it would seem to also work the other way around. Roles can or should 
be used as revelatory of ambitions. The findings of the thesis clearly suggest that it is the case: 
set of roles generate set of ambitions (and vice versa?) which can empirically be distinguished 
from one another. It would therefore be the suggestion of this explorative thesis and of its 
primary results to pursue future studies in this horizon.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The findings of this explorative study seem to suggest that parliamentarians can be 
distinguished based on their roles and ambitions, and that these "variables" are intrinsically 
linked together, as the thesis originally assumed. More precisely, the empirical results seem to 
confirm the theory that ambitions do influence and shape the behaviours, attitudes and roles 
of politicians, or as we should say with more exactitude that "there is a clear link between the 
way French members of the European People's Party in the European Parliament in the 
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2014-2019 legislature conceive and interpret their parliamentary roles and the way they 
relate to their future career plans". This complex relationship is present in at least three 
different ways for our sample: French right-wing MEPs either belonged to the ideal-types of 
European Animators, French Politicians or Local Specialists. These semantic and theoretical 
constructions are the fruit of an abductive approach strictly based on interviews and on 
background information on the political "profiles" of MEPs: the categories therefore possess 
the advantage of being relevant for the politicians themselves (the interviewees) and the 
scientific community. Indeed, once we have managed to answer our initial interrogations and 
establish these categories, then come the next questions: what do these results tell us in 
relation to previous research? And more importantly, what are the take-away of the thesis' 
findings for future research? 
 
In a certain sense, the answer to the first question leads inevitably to answering the second. As 
we argued, the point of departure of this thesis was to say that previous research in European 
studies is incomplete to give a full account of explanations on the behaviours of European 
parliamentarians, and that when theoretical concepts do exist, they are not entirely satisfactory 
(quantitative, based on roll-call votes, etc...). This is why we turned our focus to American 
political science and its "ambition theory", where theoretical concepts to explain the attitudes 
and roles of politicians are well-established traditions. However, the findings of this thesis 
seem to suggest that, to a certain extent, the "tools" emanating from American political 
science are also not entirely appropriate to explain the roles of "specific" politicians in a 
"specific" context: French members of the European Parliament. The data gathered from the 
interviews and the political profiles of the respondents, plus the analysis of the empirics, 
clearly indicate that "ambition" as it is today understood in the literature, should be nuanced. 
This is particularly true to French politicians in the European Parliament for whom the inner 
logic of individual candidacies and stated ambitions one can find in mainstream American 
politics, is especially irrelevant. As we discovered, in the minds of French politicians serving 
in the European Parliament, there is no individual campaigning without the support of the 
party: to parody the opening lines of this Master's thesis, "French MEPs are not born to run, 
they are called to run". This does not mean per se that they are less ambitious than their 
American counterparts or that they are not as free to acquire means to pursue their own 
ambitions the way it is done on the other side of the Atlantic, but that political scientists could 
do a better job in explaining the formation of career ambitions and how parliamentarians 
(European and national) link them directly to their parliamentary roles at a general level. 
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Now, what are the implications of this explorative study's preliminary results for future 
research? More precisely, what are the consequences of the thesis for European studies? First, 
when it comes to the methods to employ in order to gather good and reliable data on 
politicians’ ambitions and other “psychological predispositions”, the study clearly suggests 
that there is an added value in coming back to the fundamental roots of ambition studies: 
“probing, qualitative studies” (Gaddie 2004: 201). Indeed, as Gaddie remarks about 
participant observations and following politicians on the tracks, and as it could be said on 
using unstructured or semi-structured interviews and already being part of the politicians’ 
environment: “(…) the easiest way to blend in is to become an active participant. By avoiding 
a structured instrument, I was free to navigate interesting events as they unfolded rather than 
forcing my subject back to my list of topics. Political people love to talk…” (2004: 202). It is 
thus quite surprising that these types of approaches have been more or less neglected in 
European studies to analyse politicians’ roles and desired futures, and it would be the first 
“recommendation” of this thesis to pursue efforts, or, for the least, partially come back to 
these methodological standpoints. Second, and from an empirical perspective, the results 
seem to suggest that the relation ambition-role could be found at an even wider level than the 
one used for our sample. Without any doubt, these schemes of analyses could be applied at 
the scale of the complete French delegation in the EP (or its 74 MEPs). French politicians 
think in French terms, relate to French events and imbricate their French political culture in 
their European mandate: the interviews clearly demonstrated that. The fact that only French 
right-wing MEPs were part of this study does not seem to make the results any less true for 
the other political parties in the French delegation. However, doubts could be cast on the 
relevance of this study at the scale of the whole European People’s Party Group in the EP. 
The fact that one of the ideal-type ended up being named the French Politician and that 
nearly all of the interviewees related to typically French political narratives to frame their 
roles and ambitions (the French party structure and selection process, the President of the 
Republic, the “cumul des mandats”, etc…), would suggest that the ambition-role linkage one 
can found among French peers would apply with difficulty for non-French MEPs. Therefore, 
future research could be dedicated to investigate whether the ambitions French MEPs express 
are idiosyncratic to the delegation or if they can be found, maybe in more subtle terms, among 
other delegations. Hopefully, these fruitful research topics would lead us to a better 
understanding of all of the European parliamentarians across legislatures. Optimistically, 
these investigations would end up making sense not only for MEPs but also for any 
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parliamentarians in Europe. The question of whether these categories could be reliable and 
valid for any type of politician (local, regional, national and European) is however one we 
dare not ask today. 
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APPENDIX 
 
a) Interviews (schedule) 
 
Interview n°1. 9
th
 of February 2015. Strasbourg. 43 minutes. 
 
Interview n°2. 11
th 
 of February 2015. Strasbourg. 33 minutes. 
 
Interview n°3. 23
rd
 of February 2015. Brussels. 31 minutes. 
 
Interview n°4. 25
th
 of February 2015. Brussels. 23 minutes. 
 
Interview n°5. 11
th
 of March 2015. Strasbourg. 17 minutes. 
 
Interview n°6. 11
th
 of March 2015. Strasbourg. 16 minutes. 
 
Interview n°7. 12
th
  of March 2015. Strasbourg. 20 minutes. 
 
Interview n°8. 24
th
 of March 2015. Brussels. 29 minutes. 
 
 
b) Respondent Interview Guide  
 
 English Version 
 
Theme I: Roles in the European Parliament 
 
I) Could you start by telling me how did you first become an MEP ? What were your 
initial motivations?  
- Were you pushed by your party to become a candidate or was it from your own 
initiative? 
 
II) Thinking about your broad role as a Member of the European Parliament, what are the 
most important duties and responsibilities involved? Which tasks do you prioritize ? 
- In your opinion, how do you differentiate a good MEP from a bad MEP ? 
 
III) As an MEP, who do you represent? 
- When you have to take a decision within your political activity, who’s 
« voice » do you prioritize: your home-party, your group or the constituents? 
Any other categories ? 
- Would you ever go against (mentioned entity) when taking a decision? 
 
IV) Thinking for a moment very broadly about French (or European) society, how do your 
duties and responsibilities fit in with the work of society as a whole? 
- How important is your work as an MEP to the functioning of society as a 
whole ? 
 
V) Thinking over your political activity, what do you find personally most satisfying 
about it? 
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- Which of your political activities has brought you the most satisfaction? 
Reversely, what did you found the most frustrating ? 
- What would you miss most if you left politics ? 
 
 
Theme II: Career Ambition(s) in the European Parliament 
 
VI) Where do you see yourself in five/ten years?  
- Are there any further positions in the European Parliament or outside that you 
would like to seek sometime in the future? 
- What would you say are your chances of achieving (mentioned position) ? Do 
you think that being MEP would help you reach this goal/position? 
 
VII) Will you be candidate to any elections before the end of your European mandate? 
- Would you be ready to interrupt your European mandate if you were called to 
national or local responsibilities? Why ? 
- For which position would you absolutely put an end to your European career ? 
 
VIII) Finally, how do you distinguish the different ambitions among your French 
colleagues ? 
 
 
 French Version  
 
Thème n°1: Le rôle de député européen 
 
I) Pourriez-vous commencer par me dire ce qui vous a donné envie de devenir député 
européen ? Quelles étaient vos motivations ? 
- Concrètement, est-ce votre parti qui vous a demandé de vous présenter ou cela 
est-il venu de votre propre initiative ? 
 
II) Concernant votre rôle de d put  europ en, d’une mani re g n rale : quels sont les 
devoirs et responsabilités les plus importantes qu’il implique pour vous ? Quelles 
tâches se doivent d’être prioritaires? 
- Selon vous, qu’est-ce qui distingue un bon d’un mauvais eurod put  ? 
 
III) En tant que député européen, qui représentez-vous ? 
- Par exemple, lorsque que vous devez prendre une décision liée à votre mandat, 
quelle voix/intérêts mettez-vous toujours en priorité : ceux de votre parti 
politique, de votre groupe au Parlement ou de votre circonscription ? Ou 
d’autres perspectives ? 
- Est-il imaginable que vous puissiez prendre une décision allant à l’encontre 
des int rêts (de l’entit  mentionn e) ? 
 
IV) Si l’on pense pour un moment de mani re g n rale à la soci t  fran aise ou 
européenne, dans quelle mesure vos tâches et responsabilités sont importantes pour 
leur bon fonctionnement ? 
 
V) D’une manière générale, êtes-vous satisfait d’être d put  europ en ? 
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- Parmi les précédentes fonctions que vous avez occupées, lesquelles vous ont 
apporté le plus de satisfaction personnelle ? 
- De mani re inverse, qu’est-ce qui vous frustre le plus dans votre mandat actuel 
et dans vos mandats précédents ? 
- Qu’est-ce qui vous manquerait le plus si vous étiez amené à quitter la sphère 
publique ? 
 
Thème n°2: Perspective de carrière et parcours professionnel 
 
I) De manière générale, où vous voyez-vous dans 5/10 ans ? 
- Y a-t-il d’autres fonctions au sein du Parlement europ en ou en dehors que 
vous souhaiteriez occupées dans un futur proche ? 
- Quels sont vos chances, à votre avis, d’occup es ses fonctions ? Pensez-vous 
que votre mandat d’eurod put  vous aideriez à atteindre ses fonctions ? 
 
II) Serez-vous candidat à de  lections avant la fin de votre mandat d’eurod put  ? 
- Seriez-vous prêt à mettre fin à vos fonctions de parlementaire européen si vous 
étiez appelé à des responsabilités nationales ou locales ? Pourquoi ? 
- Y-a-t-il un poste/une position pour lequel vous mettriez absolument un terme à 
votre mandat européen ? 
 
III) Pour conclure, comment distinguez-vous les ambitions respectives de vos 
collègues au sein de votre délégation ? Est-ce un sujet ouvert ou secret ? 
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c) Quotes (original) 
 
Each and every quotes of this section are the original version of the translated text which can 
be found in the Analysis and Discussion section of the thesis. All of the interviews were held 
in French, tape-recorded and then transcribed. The original transcripts of the interviews are in 
French but for the requirements of this thesis each quotes are personal translations to English. 
However, and in order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents interviewed, some parts 
of the quotes were deliberately omitted and sometimes changed. When this is the case, non-
italic brackets appear in the text to signify that the text was changed: (...). 
 
 
 Analysis 
 
 
 THE EUROPEAN ANIMATOR 
 
«  ’ai choisi, et, à ma connaissance, mais dans le cadre de vos travaux vous trouverez peut-
être qu’il y a maintenant d’autres cas, je suis le seul homme politique français qui a 
d lib r ment, et à un moment o  la loi ne l’obligeait pas, abandonner une carrière politique 
nationale qui n’était pas négligeable, et abandonner le plus beau des mandats politiques, qui 
est d’être maire. » INTERVIEWEE N°1 
 
« Donc voilà le facteur familial plus le facteur territorial (puisque j’ai longtemps v cue à 
Strasbourg) ont fait que je me suis toujours int ress e aux sujets europ ens, je me suis 
toujours int ress e à ce qu’on fait chez nos voisins et j’ai toujours  t  tr s attach e au projet 
europ en, par-delà la r conciliation franco-allemande, euh voilà... Donc ça m’a toujours 
int ress e. Bon apr s, mon parcours professionnel, personnel a suivi des  volutions diverses 
et vari es, au gr s des rencontres, au gr s des possibilit s (j’ai essay  de saisir à chaque fois la 
balle au bond) mais j’ai eu quand même l’opportunit  d’inscrire assez longtemps, pas tout le 
temps, mais assez longtemps mon parcours personnel et professionnel dans le sillage de 
quelqu’un, A.L, (puisque j’ai longtemps  t  collaboratrice d'A.L) qui lui-même a d couvert 
l’importance du projet europ en, au fur et à mesure qu’il avan ait, je dirais, au cours de sa 
carri re politique et donc il y a eu le fil rouge, voilà , de l’int rêt pour la chose europ enne qui 
s’est prolong . » INTERVIEWEE N°3 
 
« Et puis j’ai fait mon petit tour, voilà, pour essayer de convaincre, de trouver des alli s, parce 
qu’il y a une commission nationale d’investiture et le nombre de gens qu’il faut convaincre 
est assez limit  et donc, arm e de mon seul courage et des encouragements r els mais quand 
même tr s t nus de ma hi rarchie, je suis all  convaincre les chefs de parti et les diff rents 
membres de la commission nationale d’investiture, voilà, de l’UMP. Et je me suis trouv e 
finalement en bonne position sur la liste :  a  t  assez compliqu , il y a eu beaucoup beaucoup 
de...              s quences diverses et vari es.  e me suis retrouv  finalemet, voilà, j’ai fait 
un peu de tactique :  a je savais faire,  a fait parti de mon savoir-faire professionnel je dirais, 
j’ai fait un peu de tactique, un peu de strat gie puis trouv  à d jouer voilà... Et donc 
finalement j’ai réussie à me débarrasser de certaines concurrentes (              et je me suis 
retrouv  en 6
 me 
position. » INTERVIEWEE N°3 
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« Au sein du travail l gislatif, ce qui est le plus important c’est d’essayer ....puisque en fait 
l’initiative des lois revient à la Commission. Nous ne sommes pas à l’initiative des lois. Notre 
travail consiste à les modifier, à les amender. Et c’est ce que j’essaye de faire. D’ailleurs je 
pense être un des d put s... un des 50 d put s europ ens qui depuis le d but du mandat a 
d pos  le plus d’amendements, quelque soit les textes.  oilà. C’est un pouvoir de 
modification mais pour le faire il faut  tudier chaque texte puis avoir des collaborateurs aussi 
qui soient sur la même ligne, et c’est ce qui permet de progresser. » INTERVIEWEE N°8 
 
« La seule personne qui conna t à fond le sujet c’est le rapporteur. Et donc si vous êtes 
rapporteur même appartenant un petit groupe, on peut avoir une influence sur la contenu des 
textes qui est sans commune mesure » INTERVIEWEE N°1 
 
« Nous sommes... c’est un peu ambigu ... à la fois les repr sentant des citoyens de l’Union 
dont nous portons les aspirations, les revendications, les espoirs des citoyens de l’Union mais 
par ailleurs, un peu prioritairement, les aspirations, les revendications, les messages des 
revendications, col res, etc, interrogations de nos mandants qui sont nos  lecteurs nationaux. 
(Et donc.. Interruption...). Donc c’est un peu ambigu , on est à la fois d put  europ en mais 
on est aussi d put  europ en fran ais. » INTERVIEWEE N°3 
 
« Ben dans une mesure assez simple, c’est que entre 60 et... a d pend des ann es,  a d pend 
des sources, mais on consid re qu’entre 60 et 80  des textes de lois qui sont des lois, des 
d crêts, des r glements etc... qui seront mis en  uvre en France, sont la transposition 
d’application de texte qui auront  t  pris par le Parlement europ en. Donc  a vous donne une 
id e de l’influence et de l’importance des choix qu’on a faire ici même si m diatiquement pas 
grand-monde s’en rend compte. » INTERVIEWEE N°8 
 
« Plutôt qu’en France si vous êtes dans l’opposition vous avez un pouvoir c’est de hurler, tout 
le monde s’en fout, et si vous êtes dans la majorit  vous avez un pouvoir c’est de vous taire 
parce qu’il faut faire passer les textes du gouvernement qui « Article I, le gouvernement a 
toujours raison, Article II, quand vous êtes pas contents du gouvernement et que vous êtes 
dans sa majorit , vous vous r ferrez à l’article I    . C’est tout : r sum  de la Constitution de 
la Cinqui me R publique pour l’Assembl e nationale. » INTERVIEWEE N°8 
 
« Tout le monde s’en fout. Tout le monde s’en fout sauf la classe politique et les journalistes 
politiques fran ais. Et donc dans tout  a l’Europe est trait  même pas comme une rubrique 
sportive (parce que le sport  a int resse quand même, au moins le foot), non pas comme la 
rubrique culturelle (parce que la rubrique culturelle il y a un certains nombre de gens que la 
culture int resse), mais je dirais comme la rubrique scientifique (Rires). « Il y a des 
sp cialistes, qui sont des gens biens, mais tout  a est quand même enfin tr s chiant quoi    . 
Donc on en parle parce qu’il faut bien qu’il y ait un journal qui s’y tient. Ca c’est une vraie 
frustration qui n’est pas simplement d’ordre psychologique et pour l’amour propre. » 
INTERVIEWEE N°1 
 
« Et ce pour quoi j’ai choisi le mandat de d put  europ en plutôt que le mandat de d put  
national, c’est cette capacit  que l’on a ici, qu’à un d put  europ en, si je puis dire, si il 
travaille bien, y compris son travail politique (dans le bon sens du terme) : il peut b tir sa 
propre majorit , il peut avoir une influence importante sur le fond des dossiers mais ce qui est 
int ressant aussi, c’est cette possibilit  d’avoir cette richesse de contacts. » INTERVIEWEE 
N°1 
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«  oilà, on est lib r  des contraintes purement politiciennes, et on travaille sur la base euh.. 
voilà on fait de la vraie politique. Il faut des alliances, on cherche des accords, on travaille la 
p te europ enne pour avancer ensemble : donc  a c’est intéressant le fait qu’aucun groupe 
parlementaire n’ait la majorit  à lui seul mais soit en permanence en construction de strat gie 
d’alli s. Et donc  a c’est intellectuellement encore une fois assez excitant, assez marrant, c’est 
de la vraie politique quoi. On est pas dans le r flexe pavlovien, on est dans la construction 
politique, d’accords, de compromis comme on dit dans cette maison. » INTERVIEWEE N°3 
 
« Ben oui   Beaucoup de gens disent qu’il faut faire trois mandats pour pleinement en profiter. 
(Oui?). Et oui. La formule habituellement pratiqu e par les Allemands, les Britanniques : un 
premier mandat pour d couvrir, un deuxi me mandat pour agir, et un troisi me mandat pour 
exercer de l’influence. C’est le mod le germano-britannique. » INTERVIEWEE N°3 
 
I
1 : La fonction à laquelle j’ tais candidat et à laquelle je n’ai jamais acc d e, c’ tait 
Commissaire.  
PE : Commissaire ?  
I
1 :  oilà, mon objectif politique c’ tait d’être Commissaire europ en.  e ne le serai jamais.  
PE : Vous ne le serez jamais ?  
I
1 : Non. Il faut être propos  par le Président de la République et, là, je reviens à la description 
que je faisais du syst me monarchique : il faut baiser la babouille, il faut cirer les pompes, il 
faut ... Et je ne suis pas un cireur de pompes. Et donc ... je ne sais plus ... quatre, cinq, six fois 
j’ai pos  ma candidature pour être Commissaire fran ais. Maintenant je ne le serai plus. 
INTERVIEWEE N°1 
 
 
 THE FRENCH POLITICIAN 
 
«  C   ’    p   v    d  v             v  ? . Euh... non. Non non non.  amais j’aurais imagin  
pl bisciter un mandat comme celui-ci.  oilà c’est ... L’opportunit  s’est pr sent e, je l’ai 
prise, mais c’est une proposition qu’on m’a faite. » INTERVIEWEE N°6 
 
«  ’ai perdu aux l gislatives au lendemain des pr sidentielle et donc, comme j’ai une activit  
professionnelle, et une ind pendance totale, estimant que mon camp me trahisse c’est une 
chose, que mes  lecteurs me l che s’en est une autre, j’avais d cid  d’arrêter.  usqu’aux 
europ ennes o  ma famille politique l’UMP m’a demand  d’être tête de liste (...)  parce qu’ils 
estimaient que j’ tais le meilleur pour lutter contre (le FN) et pour tirer la liste.  ’ai beaucoup 
h sit , j’ai dit oui, et je suis reparti en politique, et je me suis retrouv  d put  europ en. » 
INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
« D’abord c’est de faire correctement son travail, le mieux possible, donc d’être pr sent. Euh.. 
ensuite j’ai eu euh... deux objectifs : d’abord je veux garder le lien entre le mandat...enfin 
essayer de trouver le lien entre le mandat europ en...enfin les responsabilit s qui sont les 
miennes notamment dans les commissions dans lequelles je si ge... Et le territoire local. Donc 
trouver le moyen de faire la connection entre le territoire, celui qui est le mien, et le mandat 
de d put  europ en. INTERVIEWEE N°6 
 
« Ce qui m’am ne dans l’action apr s : à prendre des responsabilit s à l’int rieur de la 
d l gation : je me suis fait  lire  ice-Pr sident parce que c’est l’endroit politique; à garder 
mes responsabilit s politiques au sein de mon parti : je suis membre de mon bureau à l’UMP, 
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c’est l’endroit o  se prennent les d cisions. Et à faire en sorte que dans ce nouvel h micycle, 
je puisse être dans les endroits, être dans les commissions de l’action.  ’ai choisi la 
commission Transport parce que j’estime que les transports sont importants pour la 
circulation des biens et des personnes sur la totalit  de l’Europe.  ’estime que c’est important 
pour la France qui est au milieu de tout le passage. Et j’estime que c’est important pour ma 
circonscription. » INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
«  ’appartiens à une sensibilit  politique de droite que j’assume, dans un groupe avec nos 
qualit s et nos d fauts, mais je suis de droite fran aise.  oilà.  e suis repr sentant de mes 
 lecteurs. » INTERVIEWEE N°2. 
 
« La difficult  que l’on rencontre, c’est que comme on a pendant un grand nombre d’ann es, 
droite et gauche confondues, tap  sur l’Europe pour dire « C’est la faute de l’Europe  , pour 
cacher nos l chet s, turpitudes, nos manques de courages ( a c’est la l chet ), une absence de 
d cisions : on aime pas le syst me europ en. Et donc il y a un discr dit de l’Europe aupr s de 
la population parce qu’on a tap  dessus sans arrêt et on en voit plus l’int rêt. Arrive 
maintenant sur le volet politique un langage populiste. » INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
« Et puis de... de dire aux  lecteurs, en tout cas aux concitoyens qu’il suffit pas de se d fouler 
aux  lections europ ennes pour que le premi re d l gation fran aise soit celle du Front 
National. Parce que  a sert à rien. Il n’y a aucun int rêt ici, aucune utilit . Et donc c’est de 
leur dire voilà l’Europe, il faut... il faut...un bulletin de vote c’est pas pour rigoler quoi. Il faut 
essayer de... (Hum). Et quand vous votez Front National, premi re d l gation,  a renforce pas 
le rôle de la France alors que c’est pas l’intention de l’ lecteur. » INTERVIEWEE N°6 
 
« La r alit  c’est que c’est un tr s beau mandat. On est pas nombreux, on est que 20 pour 
l’UMP. Ce qui veut dire que l’on est pas nombreux pour avoir une voix fran aise dans une 
France qui a perdu de l’influence au niveau europ en et qui en perd encore plus aujourd’hui 
avec la politique de M. Hollande » INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
« Ben c’est un ... c’est un grand honneur...de...de... je veux dire on est quand même tr s peu. 
Dans une vie on a ...quand on fait de la politique d’avoir des mandats comme celui-ci 
c’est...encore une fois c’est un honneur. On essaie modestement d’être à la hauteur mais oui je 
suis tr s fier. INTERVIEWEE N°6 
 
« La seule chose qui m’a manqu e, et c’est notamment la raison pour laquelle je suis retourn , 
c’est le combat   Le combat politique, c’est comme un sportif de haut niveau, quoi   On a 
envie de faire un combat politique, d’affronter les id es, d’ changer, d’essayer de s’affirmer, 
d fendre ses positions, d’avancer ses pions de fa on à ce que ces id es avancent, voilà. Donc 
 a c’est la seule chose qui m’a manqu e parce-que .... Donc j’ai une activit  professionnelle, 
j’ai des r mun rations donc... c’est simplement la conquête du pouvoir et l’ change 
d’id es. INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
« Mais quand on prend, nous, une d cision au niveau europ en de trouver des subventions 
pour des agriculteurs qui sont bais s dans le cadre de leurs implantations ; qu’il y a plusieurs 
centaines de millions, voir un milliard qu'il faut valider là-dessus... L’enjeu c’est que 
l’agriculteur il puisse toucher cet argent. Mais avant qu’il le touche, bonjour   C’est d’une 
complexit  pour y arriver. Et donc il n’y a aucune chance pour qu’il y arrive. Ca  a ne me 
frustre pas, mais  a va m’ nerver tr s vite   » INTERVIEWEE N°2 
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« En un an j’ai pris ce que je voulais... j’ai pris ce que je voulais donc je suis satisfait.  e 
pourrai mieux r pondre à cette question, parce-que je suis un jeune parlementaire europ en, 
quand j’aurais parfaitement compris les zones d’influences.  oilà. Donc là pour mon premier 
mandat j’ai eu ce que je voulais et donc.. euh... je pense que cette question je pourrai y 
r pondre plus facilement dans un an ou deux. INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
« Non, pour l’instant non. Bon là c’est faire correctement le job mais euh...  P   d’ bj c    d  
mi-mandat ?). Non non. C’est faire correctement le job, avoir un rapport, avoir des sujets sur 
lesquels on est reconnu dans sa commission. Mais pas plus que  a pour l’instant. (   -c    ’   
         j       v              p    c          ?. Ben ceux sur lesquels je travaille...euh ... 
(...) sur le droit d’auteur, l’enjeu que cela peut repr senter sur le fond et puis parce que c’est 
aussi d fendre les int rêts de la France. » INTERVIEWEE N°6 
 
« Ecoutez, moi j’ai 47, dans 5 ans  a sera la fin du mandat. Ben j’esp re en faire un autre. 
(Hum ?). Et puis euh.. ben dans 10 ans, je sais pas. (Vous savez pas ?) Non. Non (c’    p   - 
        p        ? . Ben vous savez les choses c’est... encore une fois il y a deux ans 
j’imaginais pas être d put  europ en. Donc euh... quand j’ai commenc ...quand j’ai termin  
mes  tudes jamais j’aurais imagin  faire de la politique. Euh... donc la vie elle est faite 
d’opportunit s, d’occasions, de rencontres, euh... donc euh vous dire, 5 ans c’est d jà 
beaucoup, mais bref, 10 ans donc impossible à concevoir » INTERVIEWEE N°6 
 
« Pffffffff.... Aucune id e. Aucune id e.  e ferai tout pour être heureux. (Oui ?). C’est pas une 
quête individuelle,  a sera de toute fa on une quête collective, c’est à dire que j’ai toujours 
travailler pour... je suis m decin... j’ai toujours travaill  pour l’int rêt g n ral, j’ai toujours  t  
repr sentant des  tudiants, de ma profession... je me suis toujours engag  pour un bien 
commun donc peut-être que je serai dans la caritatif et l’associatif, peut- être que... euh... 
j’ crirai des livres ou de la po sie euh... de toute fa on, je pense qu’il faut avoir une  l vation 
intellectuelle et je pense qu’il faut rendre ce qu’on a re u. » INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
 
 THE LOCAL SPECIALIST 
 
« A vrai dire, c’est M.B qui a toujours consid r ...enfin quand je dis a toujours consid r ... 
depuis 1994, B. a toujours....milit  pour que je sois candidat aux europ ennes. A cause des 
sujets agricoles et à cause du fait que j’ tais reconnu sur ce sujet-là. Il s’est battu pour je sois 
sur la liste en 1994 » INTERVIEWEE N°5 
 
« Apr s sur le mandat lui-même c’est vraiment une opportunit , moi, je n’avais absolument 
pas de plans de carri res sur  a : j’avais imagin  faire beaucoup d’autres choses plutôt au 
niveau de la r gion d’ailleurs, au niveau de l’Alsace.   aucun moment je ne me suis vu 
d put  europ en et là voilà, c’est les circonstances : il fallait une femme, (de la région, et sur 
la liste) engag e politiquement ce qui  tait mon cas puisque j’ tais engag  avec des 
responsabilit s avec l’UMP du Bas-Rhin, et qui appr ciait les questions europ ennes, ce qui 
 tait mon cas aussi. En tout cas, il n’y avait pas de plan de carri re pour devenir d put  
europ en. INTERVIEWEE N°4 
 
« C’ tait pour moi quelque chose de ... qui n’ tait pas pr visible, qui n’ tait pas r fl chi. On 
m’a propos  politiquement, les coll gues politiques m’ont propos , les coll gues politiciens 
m’ont propos , voilà.  ’ tais membre du gouvernement pendant 10 ans: je pouvais 
recommencer encore une deuxi me manda...une troisi me mandature mais les coll gues ne 
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m’ont pas propos  de faire autre chose parce qu’il y avait cette possibilit  d’être d put  
europ en. Alors je me suis dit : « Pourquoi pas ?   et puis je me suis lanc , et voilà   » 
INTERVIEWEE N°7 
 
« Moi je viens d’une (r gion) donc..euh... j’essaye de faire en sorte que (ma région) puisse 
b n ficier de mon mandat de d put . Et j’essaye de voir, d’avoir ici, avec mon  quipe : on 
essaie de voir avec mon  quipe quels sont les instruments, quels sont les instruments 
financiers dont peuvent b n fici s (ma région) qui n’en ont pas encore. Et c’est le travail 
qu’on a fait pendant la derni re l gislature. »  INTERVIEWEE N°7 
 
« Ici, si vous voulez être l gitime, il faut bosser. Euh...  e suis pass  à la Commission de 
l’agriculture...  ’ai fait donc tout à la Commission de l’agriculture en tant que titulaire, j’ai 
pass  5 ans à la Commission des transports comme suppl ant et je suis aujourd’hui à la 
Commission de l’environnement. Dans les trois commissions c’est la même chose. Il y a ceux 
qui sont pr sents, ceux qui sont respect s parce que connaissant leurs sujets, connaissant 
leurs.... tant constant dans les id es, et puis ceux qui sont entit s n gligeable. Et... la ...la vraie 
diff rence d’un d put  à l’autre je pense que c’est la qualit  du travail. Et la reconnaissance 
de ce travail par les pairs. »  INTERVIEWEE N°5 
 
« D’abord je voudrais rappeler ce qui figure dans la Constitution fran aise et dans les trait s 
de l’Union qui ont instaur  le Parlement europ en, c’est qu’il n’y a pas de mandat imp ratif 
(oui !). Ce que tout le monde oublie tout le temps   Ceux qui vous dit je propose 110 
propositions ou 60 engagements (si  a vous rappelle des  lections r centes), ils peuvent les 
trahir sans crainte puisqu’il n’y a pas de mandat imp ratif.  oilà. Moi je fais pas de 
promesses, je suis d’autant plus tranquille... » INTERVIEWEE N°8 
 
«  e repr sente les citoyens de ma circonscription, hein : ma circonscription c’est l’Est de la 
France, donc c’est 5 r gions administratives de l’Est. Donc je repr sente les citoyens 
individuels mais mon id e c’est aussi de repr senter les organisations professionnelles, la 
soci t  civile organis e qui d fend des int rêts particuliers, quoi. » INTERVIEWEE N°4 
 
« La difficult  c’est de...la difficult  de faire reconna tre sur le terrain le travail qu’on fait. En 
g n ral on est assez bien reconnu par le secteur pour lequel on travaille. Euh.... La chimie, la 
chasse, l’agriculture, le transport etc... De là à avoir une l gitimit  plus large dans l’opinion 
publique.... » INTERVIEWEE N°5 
 
« Il faut être pr sent pour r pondre aussi à leurs int rêts. Et je donc... Ca c’ tait pour 
euh...pendant la derni re l gislature, et  a continue maintenant, voilà.  a continue pour (la 
circonscription), c’est-à-dire qu’on veut .... ous savez qu’eux b n ficient du FED comme les 
pays africains (       p     d                   -      c’       d      p    p       
d  v   pp       -           -                . Mais ce ne sont pas des pays en d veloppement 
comme les pays d’Afrique par exemple. Ils sont d jà à un niveau un peu plus là... mais ils 
utilisent le FED. Alors on essaye avec mon  quipe...on va essayer de proposer un autre...un 
instrument beaucoup plus flexible, inscrit dans le budget de l’Union europ enne, voilà, qui 
permettent l’utilisation du...de cet instrument beaucoup plus facilement que le FED. » 
INTERVIEWEE N°7 
 
« C’est une belle exp rience. Oui oui oui. C’est passionant. C’est tr s prenant mais c’est 
vraiment passionant. (  ’   -c      v    p     d          d   ? . Alors moi j’aime la 
diversit .... C’est tr s divers, hein. Alors au d but c’est difficile parce- que l’on passe 
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vraiment d’un monde à l’autre et r guli rement : alors on passe d’un sujet à l’autre, des sujets 
tr s techniques, tr s sp cifiques. Donc moi qui suis en commission Emploi, en commission 
Industrie, qui suit un peu les questions agricoles, on passe d’un sujet à l’autre et à chaque fois 
il faut se remettre dans le bain...enfin voilà... Apr s vous passez d’un lieu à l’autre, voilà, 
entre votre territoire, le Parlement à Strasbourg, le Parlement à Bruxelles, donc c’est tr s 
vari , c’est tr s riche, et puis moi j’aime beaucoup le contact avec les gens. » 
INTERVIEWEE N°4 
 
«  e tire du plaisir à  a parce qu’on a fait des choses pour (toute la circonscription). On a 
d fendu des dossiers (pour toutes les régions) et puis voilà.  e veux dire euh...C’est un mandat 
tr s tr s int ressant. (Oui). Tr s tr s int ressant.  e le...bon c’est tr s bien... e veux dire on est 
là tout le temps à suivre nos dossiers, et voilà,  a fait travailler. Et puis on est satisfait quand 
un texte est r ussit, et la satisfacation c’est l’envie de travailler. Oui oui. INTERVIEWEE N°7 
 
«  e viens de loin quand même.(...). Frustrer, si j’ tais à me plaindre pour repartir au pays tout 
le temps etc... a serait une frustration. Mais j’ai trouv  du plaisir à travailler ici et puis 
bon... e compense cette frustration par rapport au plaisir que je trouve à travailler. C’est 
...c’est tout. » INTERVIEWEE N°7 
 
« Parce que je voulais faire le deuxi me mandat, à la fois pour finir la PAC et pour (comme 
c’est un deuxi me mandat on peut prendre plus de responsabilit s)...de fait on est venu me 
chercher pour prendre la Pr sidence de la Commission de l’Agriculture. (-Ah oui ?). Euh... 
 oseph Daul me l’a propos , le Commissaire pr c dent M. Boel me l’a propos , Di Castro le 
Pr sident sortant m’a dit : « C’est toi (...) qui doit prendre ma place   etc...  ’ai pas accept  de 
prendre la Pr sidence de la Commission de l’Agriculture parce que c’est pas compatible avec 
le mandat de maire de (ma commune).  e suis oblig  de limiter mon temps vraiment ici ou à 
Bruxelles : je passe le temps qui est n cessaire à mon mandat, c’est-à-dire participer aux 
s ances, participer aux r unions de travail, de groupes etc... Mais je peux pas d border : un 
poste de maire est tr s pregnant, donc voilà. (-Oui). Mais... mais si vous voulez si j’avais 
mener mon plan personnel je ne serai pas Maire de (ma commune) et j’aurais pris des 
responsabilit s au Parlement europ en » INTERVIEWEE N°5 
 
 
 Discussion 
 
« Mais quand vous d tes fonction nationale, vous pensez à quoi ? D put , s nateur ou ministre 
? Il n’y en a que trois des fonctions nationales. Enfin bon, Pr sident de la R publique  a serait 
peut être un peu s’avancer quand même   (            Là, je n’y pense gu re à vrai dire euh... 
 e n’y pense même pas du tout... Mais bon comme il y a incompatibilit  si d’aventure, oui, il 
devait arriver quelque chose de l’ordre de l’acquisition d’un mandat national, de facto je 
mettrais fin à ma fonction de d put  au Parlement europ en. Mais  a serait une strat gie qui 
aurait  t  construite, qui serait euh voilà...d velopper, au sens cycliste du terme je dirais, tr s 
longuement etc etc.  e n’en suis pas du tout là aujourd’hui. (V     ’y pe  ez p   ?    e ne 
pense pas à emmerder la terre enti re et tous les caciques des mon parti pour à tout prix qu’ils 
m’accordent une investiture pour quelque chose, hein. Mais je sais simplement, parce que je 
suis un petit peu exp riment  apr s les quelques ann es que je tra ne dans le milieu, je sais 
qu’il se passe souvent des choses que l’on a pas soit-même pr parer ou anticiper parce qu’il y 
a des strat gies politiques collectives, il y a des strat gies qui sont construites par la famille 
politique auxquelles de temps en temps il est convenable de se plier.  oilà. C’est tout.  e...je 
ne dis rien de myst rieux. » INTERVIEWEE N°3. 
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«  ’ai pas le choix   (V     ’ vez p   le ch ix ?   Quand on vous appelle au gouvernement, 
vous ne d tes pas non. Si vous êtes là pour servir. Moi je l’ai fait deux fois d jà.... Euh... est-ce 
qu’on m’appelera ?  ’en sais rien. Place un peu au jeune peut- être. Si on m’appelle j’ai pas le 
choix, on dit jamais non au gouvernement, c’est mon devoir. » INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
« Ah ben oui  videmment   Pour revenir au gouvernement, oui bien s r (Oui ?). Ah oui bien 
s r   Enfin, dans un domaine qui a trait à ce que je sais faire. Mais bon la question ne se pose 
pas dans les ann es qui viennent... (Rires/grincement) » INTERVIEWEE N°1 
 
«  e vais reformuler ta question par rapport à ton ressenti. C’est tr s tr s important pour un 
homme politique d’entrer au gouvernement. Et pour un homme politique il n’y a pas de 
carri re r ussie si on n’entre pas au gouvernement. Moi j’ai  t  deux fois.  e suis tr s content 
de l’avoir  t  et probablement au plus bel endroit au meilleur moment.  oilà . Maintenant il y 
en a qui rêvent d’y retourner et il y en a qui rêvent d’y entrer, et qui ferait tout pour le faire. 
Moi je l’ai eu, j’ tais tr s heureux.  e ne me prostituerai pas pour le faire.  e suis 
compl tement d tach  de  a. » INTERVIEWEE N°2 
 
« Non. Non non. Ca m’int resse....c’est quoi ? c’est d’être Ministre ? Ca m’int resse pas   
Aucun int rêt   La vacuit  compl te de ce genre de poste ne soul ve en moi aucun 
enthousiasme, aucun int rêt. Ce qui peut para tre bizarre pour quelqu’un qui a travaill  proche 
du pouvoir mais c’est...  e n’ai pas la pr tention de laisser une trace dans l’histoire   Ca ne 
marche pas comme  a... « INTERVIEWEE N°8 
 
« Ah non. Dans un futur proche, non non non non. Non non. De toute fa on il n’y a aucune 
fonction qui se profile à l’horizon. La fonction de Pr sident de Groupe est occup  
actuellement je crois assez s rieusement (          , voilà. Non, il n’y a pas d’autres 
fonctions que j’ambitionne. (     e     i e ce  e     i  i   p   exe ple ?   Ah non non 
non,  a des choses tellement compliqu  à mettre en branle, euh... Non non je ne l’ambitionne 
pas du tout, je ne souhaite pas du tout d velopper la moindre strat gie à cet  gard. Non pas du 
tout. Non non. »  INTERVIEWEE N°3 
 
«  e suis incapable de vous r pondre à cette question. Incapable de vous r pondre.  e ne peux 
pas vous dire. Je vois pas. Je vois pas. (Vous ne savez pas ?). Non, non.  e serais d put  
national avec ma circonscription, avec une candidature personnelle, unique ; si j’aime ce que 
je fais je vous dirai « Ben voilà, je serai r  lue, je m’implique sur le territoire  . Mais là, vous 
savez, la composition des listes, la constitution des listes est tellement 
euh... h  i   i   ...comment dire...je veux pas dire compliqu  mais aujourd’hui je ne suis pas 
capable de vous dire que je serai à nouveau en position  ligible sur la liste. Beaucoup de 
d put s europ ens fran ais ont fait des passages de 5 ans et ne sont pas revenu, hein. Donc 
id alement aujourd’hui je vous dirai «  e serai ravi d’être encore là, de faire plusieurs mandats 
  parce-que d jà  a m’int resserait,  a me passionerait mais aussi parce-que je pense que  a 
serait une bonne chose pour la France d’avoir cetta stabilit  au niveau des  lus mais je suis 
pas capable de vous dire euh....  a serait un v u, voilà   Oui c’est un v u, c’est un v u. » 
INTERVIEWEE N°5 
 
 
d) Tables  
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Table 1. Political profiles and biographies of the eight respondents interviewed  
 
 Interviewee 
n°1 
Interviewee n°2 Interviewee 
n°3 
Interviewee 
n°4 
Interviewee 
n°5 
Interviewee 
n°6 
Interviewee n°7 Interviewee 
n°8 
Sex Male Male Female Female Male Male Male Male 
Age (years) > 60  50 > 60 50 > 60 50 > 50 > 60 50 > > 60 50 > 
Leadership 
position(s) in the 
EP 
- Member 
of the 
bureau of 
the French 
delegation 
to the EPP 
 
- Member 
of the 
bureau of a 
Special 
Committee  
 
- Member of the 
bureau of the 
French 
delegation to the 
EPP 
 
-Member of the 
bureau of a 
Delegation  
- Member of 
the bureau of 
the French 
delegation to 
the EPP 
 
- EPP 
coordinator 
in a 
Committee  
- None - EPP Vice-
Coordinator in 
a Committee 
 
 
- None - Member of the 
bureau of a 
Committee 
 
- Member of the 
bureau of a 
Delegation  
- None 
Other ongoing 
electoral 
mandates 
None None None None - Mayor of a 
city of 60 000 
inhabitants 
- Mayor of a  
city of 20 000 
inhabitants 
- Chair of a 
Community of 
Councils 
None None 
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Responsibilities 
in the home 
party/political 
group/EPP  
- Member 
of the 
political 
bureau of 
the UMP 
- Member 
of the 
political 
assembly of 
the EPP 
- Member of the 
political 
bureau/political 
adviser of the 
UMP 
- Member of the 
EPP Bureau 
- Member of 
the national 
council of the 
UMP 
- National 
Functional 
Secretary 
- Member of 
the EPP 
Bureau  
Local 
responsibilities 
for the UMP 
- National 
Thematic 
Secretary for 
the UMP 
 
- Local 
responsibilities 
for the UMP 
None 
 
None None 
 
Incumbent/ 
Freshman 
Incumbent Freshman  Incumbent Freshman  Incumbent Freshman  Incumbent Freshman  
Former political/ 
national 
responsibilities/ 
Relevant 
professional 
experience 
- Former 
MP  
- Former 
Minister 
- Former 
local 
mandates  
- Former MP  
- Former 
Minister 
- Former local 
mandates 
- Former 
minor local 
mandate 
- Former 
parliamentary 
assistant and 
technical 
adviser 
- Former 
parliamentary 
assistant  
 
- Former 
adviser to 
Ministers  
-  Former MP  
- Former 
parliamentary 
assistant  
- Former 
member of a 
local 
government  
- Former 
substitute of an 
MP 
- Former local 
mandate 
- Former 
parliamentary 
assistant 
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Table 2. Coding scheme to establish the roles of the eight respondents interviewed 
 
 
 Motivation Duties and 
responsibilities 
Representative role Importance of 
MEPs/EU 
Satisfaction Frustration 
Shared Interviewee n°2/ 
Interviewee n°6/ 
Interviewee n°7 
(none) 
Interviewee n°3/ 
Interviewee n°4/ 
Interviewee n°6/ 
Interviewee n°7 
(linking mandate to 
the local territory) 
Interviewee 
n°7/Interviewee n°4 
(constituency) 
Interviewee n°2/ 
Interviewee n°6/ 
Interviewee n°8 
(pedagogical role)  
Interviewee n°2/ 
Interviewee n°6 
(honoured of being 
among the few 
representing France) 
Interviewee n°2/ 
Interviewee n°4 
(complexity of the 
institution) 
Shared Interviewee n°1/ 
Interviewee 
n°3/Interviewee 
n°5/Interviewee 
n°8 (very) 
Interviewee n°2/ 
Interviewee n°1/ 
Interviewee n°3 
(*2) (taking 
responsibility and 
having influence) 
Interviewee 
n°2/Interviewee 
n°1/Interviewee n°3/ 
Interviewee n°6 
(constituency + 
France) 
Interviewee n°1/ 
Interviewee n°3/ 
Interviewee n°8 
(*2) (work on the 
projects of the 
future)  
Interviewee 
n°1/Interviewee 
n°3/Interviewee n°7 
(working in an 
international 
environment) 
Interviewee n°1/ 
Interviewee n°3/ 
Interviewee n°8 
(lack of attention 
from the media and 
the French political 
class) 
Shared Interviewee n°5 
(*2)/ Interviewee 
n°4 (ambiguous)  
Interviewee n°5/ 
Interviewee n°8 
(good 
legislation/capacity 
of listening) 
Interviewee n°5/ 
Interviewee n°8/ 
Interviewee n°3 (*2) 
(citizens of the EU) 
Interviewee n°5/ 
Interviewee 
n°7/Interviewee 
n°4 (benefiting to 
a sector or 
population) 
Interviewee n°4/ 
Interviewee n°5 
(specializing in one 
topic) 
Interviewee 
n°5/Interviewee 
n°6 (being 
recognised by the 
local territory)  
Shared      Interviewee n°8 
(contributing to peace 
in Europe) 
Interviewee n°7/ 
Interviewee n°4 
(*2)/ Interviewee 
n°3 (*2) (not really 
frustrated) 
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Table 3.  Ideal-types of the roles and ambitions of the eight respondents interviewed 
 
 
IDEAL-TYPES Role(s): The European Animator Role(s): The French Politician  Role(s): The Local Specialist  
MEPs Interviewee n°1/ Interviewee n° 3/ 
Interviewee n°8 
Interviewee n°2/ Interviewee n°6 Interviewee n°5/ Interviewee n°4/ 
Interviewee n°7/ Interviewee n°8 (*2) 
Motivation Very motivated No motivations Motivated but unexpected.  
Duties and responsibilities Exercising influence: Preparing the 
legislative work, the votes and being 
a reporter. 
Exercising influence: choosing 
strategic committees and making the 
link with the needs of the local 
territory. 
To work-hard to be recognised by the 
peers and the electorate: being present in 
Brussels and investing in committee-
work. 
Representative role Represent France and the citizens of 
the EU 
Represent France Represent the constituency  
Importance of MEPs/EU MEPs work on the projects of the 
future. 
Pedagogical role of MEPs MEPs as intermediaries between the 
constituency and their European mandate. 
Satisfaction Very satisfied to work in an 
international, multicultural 
environment and contributing to a 
project. 
Proud and honoured to be among the 
happy few representing their country. 
Happy to work on specific, technical 
issues. They are hard-workers. 
Frustration The complete lack of attention from 
the French media and political class. 
The complexity of the institution 
which makes it hard to establish a link 
with the constituency. 
No real frustrations. 
Political profile/biography Incumbent MEPs. They exercise 
responsibilities in the French 
delegation, in the EPP Group, in their 
home party and in Committees.  
Freshmen MEPs. Former MPs or 
important national responsibilities. 
Incumbent and Freshmen MEPs. They 
exercise important responsibilities within 
Committees. Strong local roots. 
Godfathered by a European figure.  
Ambitions Ambitious within the EP. Between 
static and intrainstitutional ambition. 
Ambitious in and without the EP. 
Between static and progressive 
ambition.  
Most heteroclite ambitions: between 
discrete and static.  
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